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I. General Part – Overview of the Corporate Law 
Framework 
 
1. Nature of and distinction between various types of companies 
 
Dutch law provides for the following limitative list of legal forms of a com-
pany: 
Eenmanszaak (Sole Proprietorship) 
Maatschap (Partnership) (art 7A:1655 Dutch Civil Code, DCC) 
Vennootschap onder Firma (General Partnership) (art 16 Commercial Code 
(CC)) 
Commanditaire Vennootschap (Limited Partnership) (art 19 CC) 
Vereniging (Association – Informal or Formal) (art 2:26 DCC) 
Stichting (Foundation) (art 2:285 DCC) 
Coöperatie (Cooperative) (art 2:53(1) DCC) 
Onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij (Mutual Insurance Society) (art 2:53(2) 
DCC) 
Besloten Vennootschap (equivalent of Private Limited Company, ‘BV’) 
(art 2:175 DCC) 
Naamloze Vennootschap (equivalent of Public Limited Company, ‘NV’) 
(art 2:64 DCC) 
The Formal Association, the Foundation, the Cooperative, the Mutual In-
surance Company, the BV and the NV must be incorporated by a notarial deed. 
Dutch law distinguishes between NVs and BVs (‘Corporations’). The DCC 
includes separate chapters with rules for both legal entity forms. Although the 
BV was introduced in 1970 as a clone of the NV, since the modernization and 
flexibilisation of the BV legislation in October 2012 there are substantial and 
relevant differences in the rules that apply to NVs and BVs. Nowadays the BV is 
distinct from the NV. 
 _____ 
∗ Iris Wuisman and Rogier Wolf would like to thank Daniel van der Vliet and Gilles Becker, 
former student assistants, and the Department of Company Law of Leiden Law School for their 
effort and assistance on this research project. 
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Dutch corporate law provides for several types of NVs. NV-shares can be 
either in registered form or in bearer form and combinations of various types of 
shares within an NV is possible. The shares of an NV can be publicly traded, but 
the NV may also be a private company as there is no obligation that the NV-
shares have to be listed. Furthermore, the articles of association may provide for 
a restriction on the transfer of shares. The Board of Directors of an NV has the 
obligation to keep a shareholder register solely in the case of registered shares 
(art 2:85 DCC). Consequently, the NV does not necessarily know the identity of 
its shareholders.1 Failure to comply with art 2:85 DCC constitutes a criminal act 
pursuant to art 1 (4) Economic Offences Act (Wet op de Economische Delicten, 
EOA). 
The BV is mostly used as a closely held Corporation. Shares of a BV are reg-
istered and, in principle, not freely negotiable; they must first be offered to fel-
low shareholders if a shareholder wants to exit. A statutory deviation from this 
rule is possible, this creates an open BV, ie a BV with freely negotiable shares 
(art 2:195 DCC). Dutch corporate law does not include a prohibition on listing 
BV-shares and the Securities Custody and Transfer Act does not seem to provide 
for rules or regulations that prevent BV-shares from being included in the secu-
rities custody and transfer system.2 As a result, BV-shares can be listed when the 
rules of the relevant stock exchange allow this. This is however not customary. 
The Board of Directors of the BV must keep a regularly updated register of its 
shareholders (art 2:194 DCC). Failure to comply with art 2:194 DCC constitutes a 
criminal act pursuant to art 1 (4) EOA.  
Dutch corporate law does not make an explicit distinction between the du-
ties of directors (Directors) in public Corporations and non-public Corpora-
tions. However, the Dutch Financial Supervision Act and ancillary legislation 
provides for specific rules for securities issuers. These fall outside the scope of 
this report. In addition, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2016 (DCGC 2016) 
is applicable to listed Corporations. Although the DCGC 2016 has become mar-
ket practice, compliance cannot be demanded due to its soft law character. Still, 
its principles and practices are considered in legal proceedings where they offer  _____ 
1 On 11 April 2017, the Minister of Security and Justice issued a consultation regarding a proposal 
that further dematerialises shares in bearer form and makes it possible to identify all holders of 
shares in bearer form. With this proposal the Minister follows up on recommendations of the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes and the Financial 
Task Force that aim to combat tax evasion, money laundering and financing of terrorism: 
<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/04/11/blok-houders-van-aandelen-aan-
toonder-niet-langer-anoniem>. 
2 Kamerstukken II, 2006/2007, 31 058, no 3, 13 (MvT) and MTA Lumeij-Dorenbos, De Beurs-BV: 
kans of utopie? Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht, 11 November 2012, 413–424. 
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guidance in light of the interpretation of the unwritten general legal opinion in 
the Netherlands (de in Nederland heersende algemene rechtsovertuiging), which 
in its turn gives substance to the requirements of corporate reasonableness and 
fairness which have to be taken into account by those who are involved with the 
Corporation and have to act accordingly (art 2:8 DCC) and the requirements of 
proper performance of the directorʼs duties (art 2:9 DCC).3 Other (large) Corpora-
tions that do not fall within the scope of the DCGC 2016, are also encouraged to 
adhere to its principles.  
 
 
2. Legal personality and its consequences and the appointment, removal and 
accountability of the board  
 
General description 
 
In Dutch company law two main categories of legal forms exist: those with legal 
personality and those without legal personality. Those with legal personality 
can be divided into two groups: legal entity forms with share capital and those 
without. Each legal form is first examined as to its legal personality, property 
separation and liability. Second, the corporate bodies of each legal form are dis-
cussed. There is no legal definition of corporate bodies, but these may be de-
fined as ‘institutions’ to which the law or the articles of association have 
granted the authority to take decisions that are to be recognized as decisions of 
the legal entity (Corporate Bodies). As a result a Corporate Body has decision-
making authority regarding the affairs of the legal entity.4 While each legal form 
has its own set of rules, some rules apply to all or a selected group of legal forms 
or to a specific group within the category of a legal form. Prior to exploring each 
legal form, important rules regarding the works council are briefly explained, 
the DCGC 2016 is addressed under question 1.  
A works council must be established if an enterprise exists, regardless of 
the legal form, and at least 50 persons are working at this enterprise. The aim of 
the obligation to establish a works council is proper involvement (consultation 
and representation) of the workers within that enterprise.5  
 _____ 
3 Hoge Raad (HR) 13.7.2007, European Case Law Identifier ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7970 (ABN 
Amro). 
4 Asser/Maeijer & Kroeze 2-I* 2015/186. Arts 2:78a/189a DCC explicitly list certain corporate 
‘institutions’ as Corporate Bodies as used in specific statutory provisions governing the NV  
and BV.  
5 Art 2 Works Council Act. 
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Forms without legal personality are Eenmanszaak (Sole Proprietorship), 
Maatschap (Partnership), Vennootschap onder Firma (General Partnership), and 
Commanditaire Vennootschap (Limited Partnership). 
Eenmanszaak (Sole Proprietorship): A Sole Proprietorship has no legal 
personality and is not directly governed by Dutch civil law although it is men-
tioned in art 5(b) Dutch Commercial Register Act 2007 (Handelsregisterwet 2007, 
DCRA 2007), on the basis of which the Sole Proprietorship has to be registered 
with the commercial register of the Chamber of Commerce (‘Commercial Regis-
ter’). The Sole Proprietorship has just one owner, this being a natural person. 
The property of the owner and the ‘property’ of the Sole Proprietorship (assets 
or means kept and used for the enterprise of the Sole Proprietorship) are not 
separated. The sole proprietor (entrepreneur) is personally liable for all debts 
and obligations of the Sole Proprietorship. A Sole Proprietorship has no manda-
tory Corporate Bodies. There are no specific rules that govern the internal or-
ganisation. Unambiguously, it should be mentioned that a Sole Proprietorship 
can employ workers. The entrepreneur is the contracting party as employer. 
Maatschap (Partnership): 6 Article 7A:1655 DCC describes a partnership as 
an agreement under which two or more natural persons or legal entities have 
engaged themselves towards each other to bring together means (see below) to 
conduct certain activities with the purpose of sharing the benefits that may re-
sult therefrom (‘Partnership’). The Partnership itself is thus merely an agree-
ment and has no legal personality. The Partnership can be ‘public’ (openbaar) 
or ‘silent’ (stil), although this is not a distinction made in statutory law. A ‘pub-
lic Partnership’ presents itself under a common name and participates in society 
under this name. Public Partnerships can only perform professional activities. 
However, these activities are not defined by law.7 When non-professional busi-
ness activities are performed under a common name, a General Partnership ex-
ists and different (liability) rules apply (see below). A ‘silent Partnership’ can 
perform both professional and non-professional activities. The Partnership 
starts as of the moment of the conclusion of the agreement if no other starting 
point has been specified in that agreement (art 7A:1661 DCC). Although a writ-
ten agreement is desirable, the Partnership agreement can be concluded in any 
form, even implicitly.8 When the Partnership has an enterprise as defined in the 
Dutch Commercial Register Resolution 2008 (Handelsregisterbesluit 2008, DCRR 
 _____ 
6 Arts 7A:1655–1689 DCC. 
7 The distinction between professional and non-professional activities is sometimes difficult 
to make. 
8 HR 24 June 1932, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1932/1587 and HR 2 September 2011, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ3876 (Astense dierenartsenpraktijk). 
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2008),9 the Partnership has to be registered with the Commercial Register.10 
Each partner is bound to provide the Partnership with capital, goods, use of 
goods or labour (art 7A:1662 DCC). Each partner acquires a share in the owner-
ship of all the contributions, together this joint ownership forms the equity of 
the Partnership. All these assets may solely be appropriated for the purpose of 
the Partnership. Although it would be incorrect to describe the contributions of 
the partners as property of the Partnership as a stand-alone entity, the assets 
committed to the Partnership are insulated from claims by creditors of the in-
dividual partners. As a result, a private creditor of one of those partners cannot 
seize the partner’s share in the property of the Partnership nor can it seize all or 
certain assets since partners do not have those assets freely at their disposal.11 
The right to seize Partnership property is exclusive to Partnership creditors as 
the community of property is shielded due to affirmative asset partitioning (af-
gescheiden vermogen).12 Only when a Partnership has been dissolved and the 
individual claims on the assets (that remain after all creditors of the Partnership 
have been paid) have been transferred to each Partner, can the creditors of the 
individual partners assert their claims to those assets. These Partnership credi-
tors also have the right to assert their claims against the Partners’ private assets. 
When the obligation is divisible, a partner can only be held liable for an equal 
amount and an equal share of the debt, even when the share of one of these 
partners in the Partnership is less or smaller than that of the others (art 7A:1679 
DCC). However, it is possible to deviate from this statutory liability rule when 
entering into an agreement with creditors, as a result of which for instance each 
of the Partners is personally liable towards the creditor in proportion to a Part-
ner’s real share in the Partnership or in full instead of in equal shares 
(art 7A:1680 DCC). Partners are not allowed to decide on an external liability ar-
rangement without the consent of the third parties involved. When the obliga-
tion is non-divisible, such as an obligation to act, the partners are jointly and 
severally liable (art 6:6 (2) DCC). In 2013, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
(Hoge Raad, HR) confirmed its earlier judgment that the plaintiff in a case 
against a Partnership could assert his claim against both the Partnership and its 
partners personally.13 These are two separate claims and third parties have a 
free choice as to which claim to assert and in which order. Since the Partnership 
 _____ 
9 Art 2 in conjunction with art 8 sub b DCRR 2008. 
10 Arts 5 and 6 DCRA 2007. 
11 HR 17 December 1993, ECLI:NL:HR:1993:ZC1182 (Van den Broeke/Van der Linden). 
12 HR 15 March 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY7840 (Biek Holdings). 
13 HR 5 November 1976, ECLI:NL:HR:1976:AB7103 (Moret Gudde Brinkman) and HR 15 March 
2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY7840 (Biek Holdings). 
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itself is not a legal entity, one must litigate against the partners of that Partner-
ship that are partners at the time of the issuance of the subpoena. It is sufficient 
to state the Partnership’s name if its partners clearly carry on activities under 
that name. All Partners can then be ordered to appear at the proceedings.14 
Which partners can be held personally liable depends on the grounds used to 
hold the individual partners liable. If the legal basis of the claim is partner li-
ability under partnership law (art 7A:1680 DCC), persons that were partners at 
the moment the Partnership’s liability for the obligations (schuld) arose can be 
held liable. If the claim is based on the liability rules relating to the agreement 
of services between the third party and the Partnership, the claim must be as-
serted against the partners that were partners at the moment the Partnership 
entered into the agreement that resulted in damage (art 7:407(2) DCC). Under 
this rule, the partners involved are jointly and severally liable instead of having 
liability for equal shares. An exculpation possibility exists. When the assign-
ment has been granted with a specific person in mind who together with the 
party to the agreement or as an employee of such a party, performs activities 
under the agreement, this person is also jointly and severally liable vis-à-vis the 
third party (art 7:404 DCC).15 The liability rules relating to the agreement of ser-
vices (arts 7:404 and 407 DCC) may be excluded by the Partnership in its gen-
eral conditions. However, this does not deprive a third party of the right to hold 
partners personally liable on the basis of tort committed when performing their 
professional activities (art 6:162 DCC).16 
The Partnership has no mandatory Corporate Bodies. The internal organi-
sation of the Partnership is left to the discretion of the partners. A request can 
be filed to receive a court order for the dissolution of the Partnership. When spe-
cific requirements are met, the court may grant such an order as a result of 
which the partnership is dissolved and materially all partners are removed. 
Vennootschap onder Firma (General Partnership):17 The General Part-
nership is a species of the Partnership and similarly has no legal personality. 
All articles that apply to Partnerships also apply to the General Partnership 
unless specific rules for the General Partnership exist. The General Partnership 
can be defined as the Partnership established with the objective of performing 
non-professional business activities under a common name. The General Part-
nership has the capacity to sue and to be sued, art 51 Law of Civil Procedure 
(Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, LCP), and has to be registered with 
 _____ 
14 HR 5 November 1976, ECLI:NL:HR:1976:AB7103 (Moret Gudde Brinkman). 
15 HR 15 March 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY7840 (Biek Holdings). 
16 HR 18 September 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2745. 
17 Arts 7A:1655–1689 DCC, arts 16–18, 22–34 CC. 
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the Commercial Register.18 A substantial difference between the Partnership and 
the General Partnership concerns the representation rules. In the case of a Part-
nership, the partners do not automatically have the right to represent the other 
partners. They need a proxy. In a General Partnership each partner, in principle, 
has the right of representation of the General Partnership and thereby the other 
partners, art 17(1) Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel, CC). Limitations 
and exclusions may be agreed upon. The specific agreements relating to the rep-
resentation authority only have external effect if these are clearly defined and 
registered with the Commercial Register. Partners that are not authorized to rep-
resent the General Partnership or act under their own name, in principle, do not 
bind the General Partnership (art 17(2) CC). An important distinction in the li-
ability of partners is that partners of a General Partnership are each jointly and 
severally liable towards the General Partnership’s creditors pursuant to art 18 
CC. Partners that joined the General Partnership after its origination are also 
personally liable for obligations from before their involvement in the General 
Partnership.19 The rules relating to the affirmative asset partitioning that apply 
to the Partnership also apply to the General Partnership, without prejudice to 
what is mentioned in the previous paragraph. The rules pertaining to Corporate 
Bodies of the General Partnership are equal to those of a Maatschap (Partner-
ship; cf above no 10).  
Commanditaire Vennootschap (Limited Partnership):20 Another species 
of the Partnership is the Limited Partnership. All articles that apply to Partner-
ships also apply to the Limited Partnership unless specific rules for the Limited 
Partnership exist. The Limited Partnership distinguishes itself by having two 
types of partners (each either natural persons or legal entities), managing 
partners (beherend vennoten) and limited partners (commanditaire vennoten). 
The Limited Partnership should have at least one managing partner who can 
manage and represent the Limited Partnership and who is personally liable for 
the obligations of the Limited Partnership. If there are two or more managing 
partners they are jointly and severally liable to its creditors (art 18 CC). Articles 
19–21 CC introduce the limited partner, referred to in Dutch as a ‘silent’ partner. 
This limited partner provides capital to the Limited Partnership. His liability is 
limited to the amount of his (capital) contribution. Due to the prohibition on 
management (beheersverbod) (art 20(2) CC), the limited partner is not allowed to 
engage in management, not even with a proxy. There are diverging views on 
whether (and if so to what extent) the prohibition also applies to internal influ- _____ 
18 Arts 5 and 6 DCRA 2007 in conjunction with arts 2 and 8 sub b DCRR 2008. 
19 HR 13 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:588 (Carlande). 
20 Arts 7A:1655–1689 and art 19–21 CC. 
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ence of the limited partner on the management by the managing partner. The 
Supreme Court has not yet resolved this debate. In addition to the prohibi- 
tion on management, the name of the limited partner may not be used in the 
name of the Limited Partnership (art 20(1) CC). Depending on the circum-
stances, a limited partner who violates the prohibition on management or  
the prohibition on the use of his name could become jointly and severally liable 
to all Limited Partnership creditors even for those liabilities that arose be- 
fore the date on which the prohibition was infringed.21 The rationale of this  
liability sanction is firstly the desire to avoid creating third party mispercep- 
tion of the capacity of the limited partner. It is undesirable that due to the acti-
vities of the limited partner or the name of the Limited Partnership, the third 
party should presuppose that the limited partner is a managing partner, thus 
giving rise to third party ancillary recourse opportunities. Secondly, the prohi-
bition on management aims to prevent the limited partner acting in an irres-
ponsible and risky manner on behalf of the Limited Partnership as he could  
take advantage of the fact that he is only internally liable up to the amount  
of his contribution. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) held that the liability 
sanction imposed upon a limited partner must be in line with this rationale and 
not be disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the breach of the pro-
hibition on management by the limited partner.22 The sanction should be dis-
pensed with if and to the extent that it is not justified or not fully justified by the 
actions of the limited partner. Relevant factors that have to be taken into ac-
count to determine if a sanction should be imposed and, if so, to what extent, 
are whether the third party was aware or should have been aware of the capac-
ity of the limited partner and whether the limited partner can be blamed for the 
breach of the prohibition on management or use of name. One can expect a lim-
ited partner to be aware of the fact that he is not allowed to perform manage-
ment activities. The rules pertaining to Corporate Bodies of the General Part-
nership are the same as those of a Maatschap (Partnership; cf above no 10). 
Forms with legal personality, as found in art 2:3 DCC, are private legal 
entities – Vereniging (Association), Coöperatie (Cooperative), Onderlinge waar-
borgmaatschappij (Mutual Insurance Company), Stichting (Foundation) – and 
Corporations with share capital. 
Vereniging (Association):23 An Association is a legal entity with members, 
pursuing a particular purpose, which is different from the purpose described in  
  _____ 
21 Art 21 CC and HR 29 May 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1413 (Lunchroom De Katterug). 
22 Art 21 CC and HR 29 May 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1413 (Lunchroom De Katterug). 
23 Arts 2:26–52 DCC. 
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art 2:53(1) or (2) DCC.24 The Association may not distribute profits among its 
members (art 2:26(3) DCC). There are two types of Associations; a formal and an 
informal Association. In the case of an informal Association no formalities exist 
as to the origination of the Association other than that it is constituted by a mul-
tilateral agreement (art 2:26(2) DCC). The Association should have an identity 
distinct from the members, and should participate in society as a unit with 
rights and obligations. It is not necessary that an expressive intention to form 
an association exists and/or formal registration in the Commercial Register has 
taken place.25 The informal Association has legal personality but limited legal 
capacity, consequently it cannot acquire registered property nor be an heir. In 
order to establish a formal Association with full legal capacity (art 2:43(5) DCC) 
and limited liability (art 2:29(2) DCC), the Association must be incorporated by 
notarial deed with its articles of incorporation embodied in that deed as well as 
registration of the Association in the Commercial Register and deposit of a certi-
fied copy of the notarial deed of incorporation at the office of the Chamber of 
Commerce (arts 2:27 and 2:29(2) DCC). The formal Association has assets, 
which are separate from that of its members. In principle, none of these 
members or the Directors of the Association can be held liable for the formal 
Association’s debt. However, every Director of a formal Association is severally 
and jointly liable together with the Association for the legal acts with which he 
binds the Association as long as the Association is not yet registered with the 
Commercial Register and no certified copy of the notarial deed of incorporation 
has yet been deposited at the office of the Chamber of Commerce. Under certain 
circumstances Directors can also be liable for mismanagement (art 2:9 DCC by 
the Association itself or 6:162 DCC by third parties). Directors’ liability on the 
basis of these articles is discussed extensively under II and III (below nos 31 ff 
and 113 ff) in relation to Corporations. In the case of an Association, relevant  
circumstances that may be taken into account when determining whether the 
Director can be severely held to blame are inter alia the purpose of the Associa-
tion, the financing and whether Directors receive remuneration. Articles 
2:131/138/139/149/150 DCC shall apply accordingly in the event of the bank-
ruptcy of an Association of which the articles of association are included in a  _____ 
24 Art 2:26(1) DCC. Art 2:53(1) DCC: ‘…According to its articles of incorporation it must have 
the purpose (objective) to provide for certain material needs of its members on the basis of con-
tracts, other than insurance agreements, concluded with those members in the course of its 
business, which it conducts or causes to be conducted for this reason for the benefit of its 
members.’ Art 2:53(2) DCC: ‘…According to its articles of incorporation it must have the purpose 
(objective) to conclude insurance agreements with its members in the course of its insurance 
business, which it conducts for this reason for the benefit of its members.’ 
25 Hof Arnhem 14 April 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BJ2178. 
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notarial deed and which is subject to Company Tax (art 2:50a DCC). These arti-
cles are discussed throughout this contribution and, among other things, deal 
with liability in bankruptcy situations. The Directors of an informal Association 
are jointly and severally liable for debts arising from a juridical act of the infor-
mal Association that have become due and demandable during their period as 
Director. After their resignation they remain jointly and severally liable for these 
debts (art 2:30 DCC). The first Corporate Body of an Association is the general 
meeting, consisting of all members that are not suspended (art 2:38 DCC). The 
general meeting is conferred with all powers insofar as these powers are not 
granted to other Corporate Bodies of the Association by law or the articles of as-
sociation (art 2:40 DCC). Among these, the general meeting appoints, suspends 
and dismisses Directors (art 2:37 DCC). Appointment may be restricted by a 
binding proposal of candidates, but the general meeting of members may vote 
against the proposed candidates with a 2/3 majority of the votes (art 2:37(4) DCC). 
Both natural persons and legal entities can be appointed Director and these 
need not necessarily be members, depending on the articles of association.26 
The Board of Directors is exclusively entitled to manage the Association within 
the boundaries set by the purpose of the Association included in the articles of 
association (art 2:44(1) DCC). Divisions of duties may be included in the articles 
of association. They also may provide for limitations on the autonomy of the 
Board of Directors by requiring certain approvals of other Corporate Bodies be-
fore it can act.27 There is no statutory rule on instructions. Some argue that an 
instruction right to give detailed instructions can be granted to the general 
meeting in the articles of association in combination with the possibility for the 
Board of Directors to ignore the instruction if it harms the interests of the legal 
entity and its affiliated organizations.28 Others are of the opinion that some 
management authority can be vested in other Corporate Bodies; such a Corpo-
rate Body may then delegate the execution of this authority to the Board of Di-
rectors and in this context the other Corporate Body may instruct the Board of 
Directors how said execution should take place. However, these authors do not 
support the view that an instruction right to give detailed instructions can be 
included in the articles of association.29 There are no statutory rules specifically  _____ 
26 GJC Rensen, Tekst & Commentaar Burgerlijk Wetboek (T&C Burgerlijk Wetboek), commen-
taar op art 37 Boek 2 BW. 
27 Some authors are of the opinion that these approval rights are limited to the extent that 
they should not result in a situation in which the Board of Directors is subservient to another 
Corporate Body: CHC Overes/TJ van der Ploeg/WJM van Veen (eds), Van vereniging en stichting, 
coöperatie en onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij (2013) 188. 
28 Asser/Rensen 2-III* 2012/127. 
29 Overes/van der Ploeg/van Veen (fn 27) 323. 
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related to the (establishment of a) Supervisory Board. The Association may have 
a (facultative) provision in the articles of association with regard to the estab-
lishment and the functioning of a Supervisory Board. The articles of association 
include rules on the appointment, suspension and dismissal of supervisory di-
rectors (‘Supervisory Directors’). As commonly accepted, members of the Super-
visory Board are natural persons. There is a proposal for a Management and Su-
pervision of Legal Entities Act (Wet Bestuur en Toezicht Rechtspersonen),30 
which provides for a statutory possibility to establish a Supervisory Board and 
gives this board the authority to supervise and advise the Directors, guided by 
the interests of the legal entity and its affiliated organisations. The proposal also 
gives the Supervisory Board the right to suspend Directors. The articles of asso-
ciation may grant other authorities to the Supervisory Board.31 This proposal 
also includes a liability provision for Supervisory Directors similar to art 2:9 
DCC. Although, the DCC does not provide for a one-tier board within an Associa-
tion, such a structure does exist in practice.32 Another Corporate Body of the As-
sociation can be a Department (art 37(5) DCC). A Department can be character-
ized as an organizational unity within the Association with a legal basis 
provided by or pursuant to the articles of association.  
Coöperatie (Cooperative):33 A Cooperative is a species of the Association 
with the important difference that it can distribute profits among its members. 
All articles that apply to Associations also apply to the Cooperative unless spe-
cific rules for the Cooperative exist. Formed by a multilateral judicial act embod-
ied in a notarial deed (art 2:54 DCC), it must have the purpose, stated in its arti-
cles of association, of providing for certain material needs of its members on the 
basis of contracts, other than insurance agreements, concluded with those 
members in the course of its business, which it conducts or causes to be con-
ducted for this reason for the benefit of its members (art 2:53(1) DCC). This 
makes the Cooperative a suitable legal form for business activities. As a legal 
entity and like the Association, the Cooperative has separate property. De-
pending on the type of liability chosen, the existing members and members 
that became ex-members within one year before dissolution or date of bank-
ruptcy when relevant, are liable in equal parts for any deficit in case of dissolu-
 _____ 
30 Wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de uniformering en de verduidelij-
king van enkele bepalingen omtrent het bestuur en de raad van commissarissen van rechtsper-
sonen (Wet bestuur en toezicht rechtspersonen), Kamerstukken 34 491. 
31 Art 2:47 Voorontwerp Bestuur en Toezicht Rechtspersonen. 
32 MJ van Uchelen-Schipper, Governance en toezicht, in: JJA Hamers/CA Schwarz/DFMM Za-
man (eds), Handboek Stichting en Vereniging (2015) 250. 
33 Art 2:53-63 DCC. 
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tion (art 2:55 DCC). The time period of one year regarding the former members 
may be extended in the articles of association. The articles of association may 
also deviate from a liability based on equal parts, for instance liability may be 
connected to the contributions of the members. Liability can also be excluded or 
limited to a maximum amount in the articles of association (art 2:56(1) DCC). 
The members may only invoke such exclusion or limitation if the legal entity 
has added to the end of its name the abbreviation ‘UA’ (exclusion of liability) or 
‘BA’ (limited liability). A Cooperative that has not chosen a specific type of li-
ability adds to the end of its name the abbreviation ‘WA’ (statutory liability). See 
for Directors’ liability under Vereniging (Association). 
The same Corporate Bodies of an Association are found in a Cooperative. 
In contrast to the Association, the rules that specifically apply to the Coopera-
tive include a provision relating to the Supervisory Board (art 2:57 DCC). This 
states that the articles of association include the possibility of establishing a 
Supervisory Board, consisting of natural person(s). Members of the Supervisory 
Board are either appointed in the deed of incorporation or after the establish-
ment of the Cooperative has taken place, by the general meeting. The Supervi-
sory Board has the duty of supervising the Directors and providing them with 
advice. The Supervisory Directors are guided by the interests of the Cooperative 
and its affiliated enterprises. The Supervisory Board is authorized to suspend 
Directors, unless provided otherwise in the articles of association (art 57(3) 
DCC). The Supervisory Board also has a role in the case of conflicts of interest of 
one or more Directors (art 2:57(4) DCC). If a Cooperative meets the ‘large’ criteria 
as set out in art 2:63b DCC and fulfils other requirements such as (certain dura-
tion of) registration, it is obliged to institute a Supervisory Board. These three 
criteria are: (i) the legal entity’s equity, according to the balance sheet with ex-
planatory notes, amounts to at least € 16 million; (ii) the legal entity or a de-
pendent company34 is obliged, pursuant to law, to establish a works council, 
and; (iii) the legal entity and its dependent companies jointly employ on aver-
age at least one hundred employees in the Netherlands. Special rules apply to 
the appointment, suspension and dismissal of the Supervisory Directors of a 
‘large Cooperative’, such as the requirement of at least 3 Supervisory Directors, 
 _____ 
34 Art 2:63a DCC: In this Section (Section 2.3.2), a ‘dependent companyʼ means: (a) a legal en-
tity to which the Cooperative (coöperatie) or Mutual Insurance Society (onderlinge waarborg-
maatschappij) or one of its dependent companies has provided, for its own account, either so-
lely or jointly, at least 50% of the issued capital. (b) a commercial partnership of which an 
enterprise is registered in the commercial register and in which the Cooperative or Mutual In-
surance Society participates as a partner who is fully liable towards the creditors of that com-
mercial partnership for all debts. 
17 
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the right of the works council to recommend suitable candidates for the list of 
candidates to be proposed by the Supervisory Board, the right of the works 
council to oppose a proposed candidate, the right of the Enterprise Court (On-
dernemingskamer) to dismiss a Supervisory Director, the exclusive right of the 
Supervisory Board itself to suspend a Supervisory Director etc (art 63 f DCC). An 
important difference between a ‘normal Cooperative’ and a ‘large Cooperative’ 
is the approval right of the Supervisory Board relating to important activities or 
events relating to the Cooperative such as issuance of certain debt instruments 
(schuldbrieven), substantial investments, amendment of the articles of associa-
tion, dissolution etc (art 2:63j DCC). 
Onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij (Mutual Insurance Company):35 The 
same articles that apply to the Cooperative (arts 2:53–63 DCC), also apply to the 
Mutual Insurance Company. The main reason that this form of Association has a 
different name is found in its purpose. As art 2:53(2) DCC states: ‘According to its 
articles of association it must have the purpose to conclude insurance agreements 
with its members in the course of its insurance business, which it conducts for this 
reason for the benefit of its members.’ For Details on Corporate Bodies of the 
Mutual Insurance Company see Coöperatie (Cooperative). 
Stichting (Foundation):36 A Foundation is a legal entity incorporated by 
means of a notarial deed (art 2:286(1) DCC) that has no members, and that in-
tends to realize a purpose, mentioned in its articles of association, by using 
capital (property) which has been brought in for this purpose (art 2:285(1) DCC). 
That purpose may not include the making of distributions to its founders or 
those participating in Corporate Bodies of the Foundation. For charitable or so-
cial purposes, distributions are permitted (art 2:285(2) DCC). This said, the pur-
pose of a Foundation may also include commercial activities. The Foundation is 
often used in the Netherlands as part of anti-takeover measures of an NV and 
used for a structure with depository receipts of shares (certificaten van aan-
delen) in the case of a BV. The Foundation has its own property. It can contract 
in its own name and sue or be sued. Every Director of a Foundation is severally 
and jointly liable together with the Foundation for the legal acts with which he 
binds the Foundation as long as the Association is not yet registered with the 
Commercial Register and a certified copy of the notarial deed of incorporation 
has not yet been deposited at the Chamber of Commerce (art 2:289(2) DCC). Un-
der certain circumstances of mismanagement, Directors can be held liable 
(art 2:9 DCC by the Foundation itself or art 6:162 DCC by third parties). Articles 
2:131/138/139/149/150 DCC shall apply accordingly in the event of the bank- _____ 
35 Arts 2:53–63 DCC. 
36 Arts 2:285–304 DCC. 
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ruptcy of a Foundation subject to Company Tax (art 2:300a DCC). These articles 
are discussed throughout this contribution and, among other things, deal with 
liability in bankruptcy situations. The Corporate Bodies of the Foundation are 
a Board of Directors that is charged with the representation (art 2:292(1) DCC), 
administration and management of the Foundation (art 2:291(1) DCC). There is a 
diverse set of options to fulfil a vacancy within the Board of Directors. The most 
common way of appointment is co-option. The Board of Directors appoints the 
new directors. However, the articles of association may provide that certain (le-
gal) persons which are included in the articles of association have the authority 
to appoint the Directors. Another option would be a provision in the articles of 
association, which affords the right to bring forward a proposal of candidates. 
The articles of association will state the possibilities for deviating from this pro-
posal by the Board of Directors.37 If a Board of Directors is (partly) absent and 
the articles of association do not provide for a solution, the court may appoint 
(a) Director(s) (art 2:299 DCC). The articles of association should provide for a 
process of dismissal of Directors. Under certain circumstances the court also has 
the right to dismiss Directors at the request of the public prosecutor or any party 
that is involved. A Director that has been dismissed by the court is not allowed 
to become a Director of a Foundation for 5 years after the moment of dismissal 
(art 2:298 DCC). As with the Association, there are no statutory rules yet with re-
gard to a possible Supervisory Board. What has been explained with regard to 
Associations in relation to a Supervisory Board also applies to the Foundation. 
With respect to ‘large’ Foundations there are certain restrictions as to who can 
become a Director of such a Foundation. See below under question 3. 
BVs and NVs can be categorized as Corporations with share capital. They 
distinguish themselves from other legal forms through their (transferable) 
shares, limited liability and organizational structure. Both the BV and NV are 
able to adopt a one-tier board system instead of the two-tier board system. Cor-
porations that meet certain requirements relating to their size, are governed by 
the so-called structuurregeling, an internationally unique system that structures 
the management of ‘large’ Corporations. Both the two-tier/one-tier board struc-
tures and the structuurregeling will be discussed separately. 
Besloten Vennootschap (equivalent of Private Limited Company, 
‘BV’):38 A BV is a legal entity with capital that is divided into one or more trans-
ferable shares (art 2:175 DCC). One or more persons establish(es) the Corpora-
tion by means of a notarial deed including the articles of incorporation. At least  _____ 
37 DFMM Zaman/GJH van der Sangen, De oprichting van de stichting, in: JJA Hamers/CA Sch-
warz/DFMM Zaman (eds), Handboek Stichting en Vereniging (2015) 82. 
38 Arts 2:175–276 DCC. 
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one share is held by a party other than, and not for the account of, the Corporation 
or its subsidiaries (art 2:175(1) DCC). No minimum capital requirements apply. 
Shareholders are not personally liable for the obligations of the Corporation and 
they are not obliged to contribute to the losses of the Corporation for more than 
what has been paid up on their shares or still has to be paid up. Even though 
shareholders in principle cannot be held liable by third parties or the Corporation 
for the Corporation’s obligations, the articles of association can provide that 
shareholders can be held liable for certain obligations (art 2:192(1)(a) DCC). In ad-
dition, shareholders can be held liable on the basis of tort (art 6:162 DCC), 
though this happens only in exceptional circumstances. Liability of Directors is 
discussed extensively under II and III. A short summary is provided here. Until 
registration with the Commercial Register, Directors are jointly and severally li-
able for any juridical act performed during their directorship by which the Cor-
poration is committed (art 2:180(2) DCC). After registration Directors can be held 
liable on the basis of mismanagement by the Corporation (art 2:9 DCC), on the 
basis of mismanagement causing bankruptcy by the liquidator (art 2:248 DCC) 
and on the basis of tort by third parties (art 6:162 DCC).  
Naamloze Vennootschap (Public Limited Company, ‘NV’):39 The NV is a 
legal entity with an authorized capital (at least € 45,000, art 2:67(2) DCC) di-
vided into transferable shares. The articles of incorporation specify the amount 
of the authorized share capital and the number and the amount of the shares in 
Euros (art 2:67(1) DCC). At least one share is held by a party other than, and not 
for the account of, the Corporation or its subsidiaries (art 2:64 DCC). One or 
more persons establish(es) the Corporation by means of a notarial deed includ-
ing the articles of incorporation. Shareholders are not personally liable for the 
obligations of the Corporation and they are not obliged to contribute to the 
losses of the Corporation for more than what has been paid up on their shares or 
still has to be paid up. The NV is particularly suited for larger (listed) Corpora-
tions with large numbers of shareholders.  
The NV and the BV have a number of mandatory Corporate Bodies,  
including the Board of Directors and the general meeting of shareholders  
(‘General Meeting’). The Board of Directors is charged with the management of  
the Corporation (arts 2:129/239 DCC) and representation of the Corporation 
(arts 2:130/240 DCC). Directors can be natural persons as well as legal entities 
(art 2:11 DCC).40 Rights of appointment, suspension and dismissal may vary be-
tween NVs/BVs as a result of the applicability of the structuurregime, which is 
explained below. At the moment of establishment, Directors are appointed in  _____ 
39 Arts 2:64–166 DCC. 
40 See also HR 17 February 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:275. 
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the articles of incorporation and from that moment on (in a ‘normal regime’) by 
the General Meeting. In the case of a BV, the articles of association may provide 
that a meeting of holders of shares of a certain type (class) or indication subject 
to certain requirements appoints the Directors instead of the General Meeting 
(arts 2:132/242 DCC). The Corporate Body responsible for the appointment of Di-
rectors also has the authority to suspend and dismiss them (arts 2:134/244 DCC). 
With the BV, this authority can also be vested in another Corporate Body when 
permitted by the articles of association unless the structuurregime applies. In 
the case of a one-tier board, Directors may be suspended by the Board of Direc-
tors (arts 2:134/244 DCC). Within the limits set by law and the articles of associa-
tion, any power not assigned to the Board of Directors or another Corporate 
Body belongs to the General Meeting (arts 2:107/217 DCC). Authorisation and in-
struction rights are discussed under questions 19 and 20 and connected case 
studies. Differences between rules applicable to the BV and NV may exist. 
In deviation from what is market practice in many other countries, the Neth-
erlands has a tradition of the two-tier board structure and has only recently 
(2013) introduced a legal basis for the one-tier system. First, the two-tier system 
is discussed. The NV and BV may have a Supervisory Board of one or more Su-
pervisory Directors when this is provided for in the articles of association 
(arts 2:140/250 DCC). Only natural persons are eligible to become a Supervisory 
Director. Supervisory Directors are responsible for exercising supervision over  
the management and policy of the Board of Directors and over the general course  
of events within the Corporation. The Supervisory Board shall advise the  
Board of Directors by word and deed, also at its own initiative and even inter-
venes and takes corrective actions if necessary (within the confines set by the 
articles of association and law). To that effect, the Board of Directors provides 
the Supervisory Board in time with the necessary information to perform its du-
ties (arts 2:141/251 DCC). In performing these duties the Supervisory Directors 
are guided by the interests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises. The 
articles of association may provide for additional authorities. The Supervisory 
Directors are appointed by the General Meeting (arts 2:142/252 DCC) or in the 
case of a BV this authority may be vested in a meeting of holders of shares of a 
certain type (class) or indication subject to certain requirements if this is pro-
vided in the articles of association (art 2:252 DCC). The Corporate Body that is re-
sponsible for the appointment also has the right to suspend and dismiss the Su-
pervisory Board (art 2:254 DCC). The Supervisory Board is an independent body 
that cannot be instructed in any way.41  
 _____ 
41 JB Huizink, GS Rechtspersonen, art 140 Boek 2 BW, aant 4c. 
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The one-tier system means that rather than having a Board of Directors 
and Supervisory Board or just a Board of Directors, there is, as specified in the 
articles of association, one, unified single Corporate Body, the one-tier board, 
consisting of executive Directors (‘Executive Directors’) and non-executive Di-
rectors (‘Non-Executive Directors’) (arts 2:129a/239a DCC). While they now form 
one corporate body and are collectively responsible and liable for the perform-
ance of their duties, some tasks remain separated. The duty to supervise the per-
formance of duties by the Executive Directors must be performed by a Non-
Executive Director. The chairmanship of the Board of Directors, the making of 
proposals for the appointment of a Director and the adoption of the decisions on 
remuneration of the Executive Directors may not be assigned to an Executive Di-
rector. The appointment of Non-Executive Directors is governed similarly to the 
appointment of Supervisory Directors of ‘large’ Corporations, which will be dis-
cussed below. Rules that apply to the Board of Directors (in a two-tier board) 
also apply to the one-tier board, the new system does not have its own set of 
rules (apart from what is explicitly stipulated in arts 2:129a/239a/164a/274a 
DCC). 
The structuurregeling is a special set of rules for ‘large’ Corporations. A 
Corporation that meets certain thresholds must within two months of the  
date on which its General Meeting has adopted the annual accounts (from 
which can be concluded that those thresholds are met), lodge a declaration with 
the Commercial Register in which is stated that the Corporation meets those  
requirements (arts 2:153/263 DCC). The requirements are that (i) the total sum of 
the issued capital and the reserves amounts to at least € 16 million; (ii) the  
Corporation is obliged by law to have a works council, and; (iii) the Corporation 
and its dependent Corporations jointly employ on average at least one hundred 
employees in the Netherlands (arts 2:153(2)/263(2) DCC). The consequence of 
meeting these thresholds for three continuous years (arts 2:154(1)/264(1) DCC) is 
that the structuurregime becomes applicable, which entails that the Corporation 
must institute a Supervisory Board. Certain exemptions exist on the basis of 
particular circumstances as a result of which a ‘mitigated’ structuurregime or the 
‘normal’ regime applies. It is also possible to request dispensation from this ob-
ligation from the Minister of Security and Justice (arts 2:156/266 DCC). The Su-
pervisory Board for a ‘large’ Corporation is afforded additional authority and ba-
lances the division of power, which is perceived as necessary given the size of 
these Corporations. The Supervisory Board, consisting of at least three natural 
persons, is appointed by the General Meeting on the basis of the nominations 
from the current Supervisory Board and, for one-third of the number of Supervi-
sory Directors, the works council has the right to recommend persons for nomi-
nation (arts 2:158/268 DCC). One important power that is conferred on the Su-
24 
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pervisory Board for ‘large’ Corporations is that the Supervisory Board appoints 
Directors (arts 2:162/272 DCC). Furthermore, the Supervisory Board’s approval 
for Board of Directorsʼ resolutions is required for a number of issues including, 
but not limited to, the issuance of and acquisitions of shares, collaborations 
with other Corporations, large investments (arts 2:164/274 DCC). The absence of 
such approval however, does not affect the power of representation of the Board 
of Directors (arts 2:164(2)/274(2) DCC).  
Since the codification of the one-tier system, it is also possible to derogate 
from arts 2:158/268 DCC (arts 2:164a/274a DCC) and institute a one-tier board rather 
than having a separate Supervisory Board. The Non-Executive Directors appoint 
Executive Directors and resolutions within the meaning of arts 2:164(1)/274(1) DCC 
require the approval of the majority of the Non-Executive Directors of the Corpo-
ration.  
 
 
3. The qualifications of board members 
 
The articles of association of the NV and BV may limit the circle of persons 
qualified to be appointed as Director by setting requirements which such Direc-
tors have to meet. The requirements may be set aside by a resolution of the Gen-
eral Meeting (arts 2:132/242 DCC). The DCGC 2016 requires that the Board of Di-
rectors and Supervisory Board need to be composed in such way that the 
requisite expertise, background, competences and – as regards the Supervisory 
Board – independence are present for them to carry out their duties properly 
(Principle 2.1). Every Director (Managing/Executive Director, Non-Executive Di-
rector and Supervisory Director) should have the specific expertise required for 
the fulfilment of his duties. In the explanatory notes to the DCGC 2016 it is 
stressed that it is important that sufficient expertise is available within the 
Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board to identify opportunities and risks 
that may be associated with innovations in business models and technologies in 
a timely manner.42 Each Supervisory Director/Non-Executive Director should be 
capable of assessing the broad outline of the overall management. They should 
be able to operate independently and critically vis-à-vis one another, the Board 
of Directors, and any particular interests involved. Specific criteria apply to as-
sess the extent of ‘independence’ and to the maximum number of Supervisory 
Directors/Non-Executive Directors who meet such criteria (Best Practices 
2.1.7/2.1.8 and 5.1.1 DCGC 2016). Article 39 (1) of the European Statutory Audits 
 _____ 
42 Explanatory notes to the code, under 2.1.4.  
25 
26 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in the Netherlands | 313 
 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
Directive (2014/56/EU) requires that at least one member of the audit committee 
should have competence in the preparation and auditing of the financial state-
ments. This has been implemented in Dutch law.43 
In addition to the ‘large’ Corporations with respect to the structuurregime, 
another definition of ‘large’ Corporations and Foundations (Large Legal Enti-
ties) is used in relation to the limitation of board positions. A Large Legal  
Entity under this definition is an NV, a BV or a Foundation that is obliged by  
law to draw up a financial statement which is equal or similar to annual ac-
counts under Title 9 Book 2 DCC but does not meet at least two of the following 
criteria on two consecutive balance dates: (1) assets according to the balance 
sheet with explanatory notes using acquisition costs and production costs, with 
a value not exceeding € 17.5 million, (2) total of net turnover in the case of the 
NV or BV and either the total company revenues or total assets when these have 
to be included in the financial statement in the case of a Foundation do not ex-
ceed € 35 million, (3) the average number of employees is less than 250 during 
the financial year. The limitations of the board positions in Large Legal Entities 
are included in arts 2:132a/142a/242a/252a/297a/297b DCC. These articles specify 
which persons cannot become a Director on the Board of Directors: (i) persons 
who are a Supervisory Director or a Non-Executive Director with more than two 
Large Legal Entities, or; (ii) persons who are chairman of the Supervisory Board 
of a Large Legal Entity or of the Board of Directors of a Large Legal Entity if the 
tasks of the Directors are divided between Executive and Non-Executive Direc-
tors. For a Supervisory Director of Large Legal Entities the following limitations 
apply (arts 2:142a/252a DCC): a person who is a Supervisory Director or a Non-
Executive Director with five or more Large Legal Entities cannot become a Su-
pervisory Director. The chairmanship of the Supervisory Board and of the Board 
of Directors shall count twice if the tasks of the Directors are divided between 
Executive and Non-Executive Directors. Certain ways of calculating positions 
and exemptions apply, such as (but not limited to) the fact that the limitation 
does not apply to a Director who is temporarily appointed by the Enterprise 
Court. Management positions within one group of companies count as one posi- _____ 
43 Artikel III van het Besluit van 8 december 2016 tot wijziging van het Besluit toezicht ac-
countantsorganisaties en enige andere besluiten ter implementatie van richtlijn nr. 2014/56/EU 
van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 16 april 2014 tot wijziging 
van Richtlijn 2006/43/EG betreffende de wettelijke controles van jaarrekeningen en geconsoli-
deerde jaarrekeningen (PbEU 2014, L 158) en ter implementatie van verordening (EU) nr. 537/ 
2014 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 16 april 2014 betreffende specifieke eisen voor 
de wettelijke controles van financiële overzichten van organisaties van openbaar belang (PbEU 
2014, L 158) (Implementatiebesluit wijzigingsrichtlijn en verordening wettelijke controles jaar-
rekeningen). 
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tion. While appointments that are in conflict with these rules are null and void, 
decision-making in which a wrongly appointed (Supervisory) Director has par-
ticipated, remains valid (arts 2:132a(3)/242a(3) DCC and arts 2:142a(3)/252a(3) 
DCC). 
With regard to Associations, Cooperatives and Mutual Insurance Compa-
nies, no special qualities are included in statutory law. Unless the articles of 
association state otherwise, Directors shall be members and appointed by the 
general meeting (art 2:37(1) DCC). Articles of association may dictate specific 
requirements provided that board vacancies can be filled despite these special 
requirements.44  
With regard to Financial institutions, the Dutch legislator has imposed the 
so-called geschiktheidstoets or suitability test for persons responsible for the 
management of such institutions and supervision thereof, arts 3:8 and 4:9 Fi-
nancial Supervision Act (Wet op het Financieel Toezicht, FSA).45 These provi-
sions also refer to Dutch civil law regarding the appointment of (Supervisory/ 
Non-Executive) Directors as discussed above (cf no 23 ff).  
In Dutch Boards of Directors and Supervisory Boards of ‘large’ NVs and BVs, 
as explained with regard to the limitations on board positions, at least 30% of 
the seats should be occupied by women and at least 30% by men, insofar as 
those seats are occupied by natural persons (gender diversity: arts 2:166 and 
2:276 DCC).46 If a Corporation to which these provisions apply does not meet 
these thresholds to create a fair balance between men and women, it must ex-
plain why it does not comply, what measures the Corporation has undertaken to 
achieve that balance, and how the Corporation envisions restoring this balance 
in the future (art 2:391(7) DCC). Smaller companies, ie those with assets smaller 
than € 17.5 million, a net turnover of less than € 35 million and less than 250 
employees, must take the equal distribution of seats among men and women 
into consideration when seeking and appointing new Directors (arts 2:166/276 
(2) DCC). The DCGC 2016 stresses that the Supervisory Board shall compose a di-
versity policy for the composition of the Board of Directors, the Supervisory 
Board and, if present, the executive committee, with regard to factors such as  _____ 
44 HR 19 March 1976, ECLI:NL:HR:1976:AC5713. 
45 For the English translation of the FSA, see <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/brieven/2009/11/16/engelse-vertaling-van-de-wft.html>. 
46 This rule has been reinstalled as from 13 April 2017 as it expired on 1 January 2016: Besluit 
van 16 maart 2017 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet van 10 fe-
bruari 2017, houdende wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met het 
voortzetten van het streefcijfer voor een evenwichtige verdeling van de zetels van het bestuur 
en de raad van commissarissen van grote naamloze en besloten vennootschappen (Stb 2017, 
68). The content of the rules has not changed.  
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gender and age but also social background, nationality and expertise (see 
above no 26) in a way relevant for the Corporation (Best Practice 2.1.5). The cor-
porate governance declaration should include the diversity policy and an ex-
planation of the execution thereof. This includes an explanation of what spe-
cific objective is pursued with the diversity policy and the results of the former 
financial year.47 
 
 
4. Investigations into directors’ misconduct 
 
With regard to NVs, BVs, Cooperatives, Mutual Insurance Companies and 
Foundations and formal Associations with an enterprise for which a works 
council has to be installed (see question 2), one possibility is to start inquiry 
proceedings (enquêteprocedure). The following parties may request inquiry 
proceedings: Certain (former48) members,49 certain (former50) shareholders and 
certificate holders (holders of depositary receipts of shares51) (or in the case of 
bankruptcy their liquidators52), certain parties with an economic interest which 
is more or less on an equal footing with the interest of a (direct) shareholder,53 
the legal entity (or in the case of bankruptcy its liquidator54), parties which have 
been granted such a right in the articles of association or an agreement, certain 
associations of employees and the Advocate-General.55 Prior to such request,  _____ 
47 This is an implementation of Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts: Besluit van 22 december 2016 tot wijziging van het Besluit van 23 
december 2004 tot vaststelling van nadere voorschriften omtrent de inhoud van het jaarverslag 
(Stb 2004, 747) ter uitvoering van richtlijn 2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement en van de 
Raad van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de bekend-
making van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit door bepaalde grote on-
dernemingen en groepen (PbEU 2014, L 330) (Besluit bekendmaking diversiteitsbeleid) and 
Best Practice 2.1.5/2.1.6 DCGC 2016. 
48 Gerechtshof Amsterdam (OK) 3 March 2015, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:809 (DA). 
49 Art 2:346 (1) (a) DCC. 
50 HR 4 November 2016, ECLI: NL:HR:2016:2456 (SNS). 
51 Art 2:346 (1) (b) and (c) DCC and HR 11 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:905 (Slotervaart). 
52 HR 19 May 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AD3052, NJ 1999/670 (De Haan Beheer) and HR 29 April 
2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT0144, NJ 2005/433 (Polisol). 
53 HR 6 June 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF9440 (Scheipar); HR 29 March 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013: 
BY7833 (Chinese Workers); HR 4 February 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AR8899 (Landis); HR 10 Sep-
tember 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM6077 (Butôt) and HR 11 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:905 
(Slotervaart). 
54 Art 2:346 (3) DCC.  
55 Arts 2:345–347 DCC. 
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subject to the penalty of inadmissibility, any party must first inform the Board of 
Directors and/or Supervisory Board of its complaints against the Corporation’s 
policy and the conduct of its business (art 2:349 DCC). As regards the inquiry 
proceedings, an eligible party can submit an application to the Enterprise Court, 
a specific judicial organ within the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, with the request 
to order an inquiry. Furthermore, the party that requested the inquiry may re-
quest preliminary injunctions for (at the longest) the duration of the proceed-
ings. The Enterprise Chamber has, then, full discretion to order any preliminary 
remedy as it sees fit. As art 2:350 DCC states, the inquiry shall be ordered when 
there is a reasonable cause to doubt proper policy and conduct of business. If 
this is the case, the Enterprise Court appoints one or more experts who will in-
quire into the possible mismanagement. If these inquirers conclude that mis-
management has taken place, the original initiators of the inquiry proceedings 
or the Advocate-General on the basis of general interest may request the Enter-
prise Court to rule that the legal entity was mismanaged (wanbeleid) and to or-
der one or more of the remedies mentioned in art 2:356 DCC, including but not 
limited to: the suspension or discharge of Directors, the annulment of their 
decisions and dissolution of the legal entity. Situations in which there are 
reasonable doubts as to whether the Corporation (or the Cooperative, Mutual 
Insurance Company, Foundation or formal Association with an enterprise for 
which a works council has to be installed (see question 2)) is properly managed 
include for instance, but are not limited to: the Corporation violates disclosure 
of accounting rules, a deadlock in the decision making process of the Corpora-
tion has occurred or there is an unfair dividend policy. The inquiry proceedings 
are focussed on what is best for the Corporation and not its stakeholders. This 
means that the Enterprise Court is not limited to ordering remedies that are re-
quested by the parties to the proceedings, but may also order remedies that are 
in its view in the best interest of the Corporation. The inquiry proceedings can- 
not be limited in any way by the Corporation’s articles of association or agree-
ment.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 _____ 
56 F Veenstra, GS Rechtspersonen, art 2:345 BW, aant A. 
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II. Liability for Damage Caused to the Company 
and to the Shareholders 
 
A. General requirements – scope of duties and violation of 
duty of care of directors 
 
5. Liability of the board and its members 
 
Legal basis for liability. Directors can be liable for damage caused to the Cor-
poration on the basis of rules of company law (art 2:9 DCC), tort law (art 6:162 
DCC), contract law in the case of a services agreement (art 7:401 BW) and la-
bour law in the case of an employment contract (art 7:661 BW). The legal rela-
tionship between the Director and the Corporation may vary as a result of differ-
ent agreements and circumstances. Article 2:9 DCC is equally applicable to 
Supervisory Directors via arts 2:149/259 DCC. There is no derivative suit in the 
Netherlands. Shareholders can sue Directors and Supervisory Directors on their 
own behalf on the basis of tort. This is discussed in Part III (cf below no 113 ff) as 
this is an external liability. In the case of insolvency the liquidator can sue the 
Directors and Supervisory Directors on behalf of the Corporation. Directors of a 
BV can also be liable vis-à-vis the Corporation under certain circumstances for 
distributions (art 2:216 DCC). 
Every Director is obliged vis-à-vis the legal entity to perform his duties 
properly (art 2:9 DCC). See the answer to question 6 for an explanation of the 
duties. Article 2:9(2) DCC states that all Directors are jointly and severally li-
able in the case of improper performance of the duties (onbehoorlijke taakver-
vulling). This is a result of the fact that the performance of Directors’ duties is 
seen as a collective responsibility. An individual Director can exculpate himself 
from liability if he can prove that he (1) cannot be severely held to blame, taking 
into account the division of duties within the Board of Directors, and (2) that he 
has not been negligent in taking measures to avert the consequences of the im-
proper performance of duties. In the case of a one-tier board these rules are also 
applicable. This means that even Non-Executive Directors are collectively re-
sponsible together with the Executive Directors for the management of the Cor-
poration. Exculpation possibilities as mentioned under (1) and (2) also apply. 
To establish liability under art 2:9 DCC, one needs to prove that the Direc-
tor(s) did not properly perform his (their) duties (mismanagement).57 Liabil- _____ 
57 Please note that mismanagement as ruled on by the Enterprise Chamber in inquiry pro-
ceedings is not the same as mismanagement as meant in art 2:9 DCC. 
31 
32 
33 
318 | IS Wuisman and RA Wolf 
 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
ity due to mismanagement can only be established if the Director (or any indi-
vidual member of the Board of Directors as they are jointly and severally liable) 
can be severely held to blame, taking into consideration all relevant circum-
stances.58 Because the decision-making of the Board of Directors is always 
judged on an ‘after fact’ basis and the Directors, in taking on entrepreneurial 
risk, should have discretion in their decision-making, the additional criterion 
‘severe’ is added to blame, raising the threshold for Director liability. The Su-
preme Court has held that this threshold is justified by the societal interest that 
Directors’ acts should not be determined by defensive or risk adverse considera-
tions to an undesirable degree.59 Through case law, norms have developed to es-
tablish whether a Director can be severely held to blame for his mismanage-
ment. The circumstances that are relevant for the determination of severely to 
blame are identified in the relevant case law, also known as the ‘catalogue of 
circumstances’. These circumstances include, but are not limited to, the nature 
of the activities performed by the legal entity, the general risks resulting there-
from, the distribution of duties within the Board of Directors, possible corporate 
guidelines and the knowledge the Director had or should have had at the time of 
the alleged misconduct. In addition to these factors, case law dictates that li-
ability must be established in the light of the insight and diligence that can be 
expected from a Director who is suited for his duties and fulfils these conscien-
tiously.60 A Director should perform his tasks in the way a reasonably capable 
and reasonably acting Director is supposed to perform his duties under the 
given circumstances.61 This means that in case law objective standards are 
taken into account when determining the liability of Directors. When a Director 
acts in breach of statutory provisions or the articles of association, this pre-
sumably gives rise to improper management and severe blame. The Director 
should prove that his acts did not harm the interests of the Corporation and its 
affiliated enterprises in order to avoid liability.62 
In addition to art 2:9 DCC, liability for damage caused to the Corporation by 
Directors and/or Supervisory Directors (or Executive and/or Non-Executive Di-
rectors) can also be based on art 6:162 DCC, which is the general provision for 
tort.63 As a result the Corporation may use different legal grounds. In the ab- _____ 
58 HR 25 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
59 HR 20 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC4959 (NOM/Willemsen) and HR 5 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2628 (Tulip). 
60 HR 25 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
61 HR 8 April 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AS5010 (Laurus). 
62 HR 29 November 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE7011 (Schwandt/Berghuizer Papierfabriek). 
63 Art 6:162 DCC: ‘(1) A person who commits a wrongful act vis-à-vis another person, which 
can be imputed to him, is obliged to repair the damage suffered by the other person as a conse- 
34 
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sence of grounds for justification, the following acts are deemed to be wrong-
ful: the infringement of a subjective right, an act or omission violating a statu-
tory duty, or conduct contrary to the standard of conduct seemly in society. If 
the standard aims at protecting the interests of individuals against the damage 
and those individuals suffered damage as a result of the act(s), then one may 
conclude that the infringer committed a wrongful act vis-à-vis the harmed indi-
viduals. If the act is imputable to the infringer, then a claim in tort arises 
(art 6:163 DCC). Under Dutch law, the act is imputable if the person can be 
blamed for his tortious act or if the person is not to be blamed for the act but the 
act is imputable to him, either on a statutory basis or because the unwritten 
source of legal and moral opinion (verkeersopvatting) demands it. This does not 
mean, however, that in the case of imputing the act to a Director on the basis of 
blameworthiness, the criterion of severe blame can be circumvented. When 
the tort claim is based on mismanagement as meant in art 2:9 DCC, the Director 
must still be severely blamable.64 This means that the standard deriving from 
corporate law and from tort law coincide. An exception to this strict rule is made 
in the case law for liability based on personal acts rather than acts performed as 
a Director.65 In order for the tortious claim to be successful, there should be a 
causal connection between the act(s) of a Director and the damage incurred 
(art 6:98 DCC). One difference from the liability based on art 2:9 DCC is that li-
ability for tort is a personal liability of the Director instead of a several and 
joint liability. The liability of Directors vis-à-vis the shareholder(s) based on 
art 6:162 DCC is an external liability, which will be dealt with in Part III (below 
no 113). 
A Director can be held liable pursuant to art 7:661 DCC (causing damage to 
the Employer (the Corporation) or a third party to which the Employer is held  
liable), if there is an employment contract between the Director and the Cor-
poration. An employee should behave as is expected from a good employee 
(art 7:611 DCC). Liability may arise if the damage is a result of intent or con-
scious recklessness of the employee. In labour law conscious recklessness ex-
ists when the employee is aware of the reckless character of his act(s) immedi-
 _____ 
quence of the act. (2) In the absence of grounds for justification, the following acts are deemed 
to be wrongful: the infringement of a subjective right, an act or omission violating a statutory 
duty, or conduct contrary to the standard of conduct seemly in society. (3) A wrongful act can 
be imputed to its author if it results from his fault or from a cause for which he is answerable 
according to law or common opinion’. 
64 HR 2 March 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ3535 (Holding Nutsbedrijf Westland). 
65 HR 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX5881 (Spaanse villa); HR 5 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2628 (Tulip). See also HR 18 September 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2745. 
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ately before the act(s) take(s) place.66 There is debate about the relation between 
the requirement of ‘intent or conscious recklessness’ which applies in liability 
cases based on art 7:661 DCC with regard to a Director who is also an employee 
and ‘severely to blame’ which applies in liability cases based on arts 2:9 and 6:162 
DCC. Some are of the opinion that the requirement of ‘severely to blame’ should 
not have a different content than intent and conscious recklessness.67 Others hold 
the view that severely to blame does have a different content. Intent and con-
scious recklessness would be more subjective whereas severely to blame would 
be more objective and would lead to liability quicker than on the basis of labour 
law.68 Listed NVs must comply with art 2:132(3) DCC, which entails that the legal 
relationship between the Director and the listed NV shall not be regarded as an 
employment contract. A Director that is a legal entity cannot enter into an em-
ployment contract with the Corporation, as only natural persons can be employ-
ees. Although the law does not provide for a qualification of the agreement be-
tween the Corporation and the Supervisory Director, it is commonly accepted that 
this is not on an employee basis. The agreement can be qualified as a services con-
tract (overeenkomst van opdracht).69 On the basis of arts 2:160/270 DCC, a Super- 
visory Director of a ‘large’ Corporation under the structuurregime cannot be an 
employee of the Corporation under an employment contract. 
If the legal relationship between a Director and the Corporation is governed 
by a management contract, that relationship is considered to be a services 
agreement (art 7:400 DCC). The Director should behave as a ‘good service pro-
vider’ (goede opdrachtnemer) when performing his duties under the agreement. 
If the Director or Supervisory Director does not perform their duties as requested 
under the agreement, they can be held liable on the basis of breach of contract 
(art 6:74 DCC).  
Article 2:216 DCC is applicable to the BV (not the NV) and deals with distri-
butions by the Corporation. The General Meeting has the authority to decide 
on the allocation (appropriation) of the profits which have been determined by 
adoption of the annual accounts, and on the adoption of distributions, to the 
extent that the equity (total assets and liability) of the BV exceeds the reserves 
which have to be maintained by virtue of law or the articles of association. The  _____ 
66 HR 20 September 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZC2142 (Pollemans/Holding Hoondert), HR 11 Sep-
tember 1998, ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZC2702 (Van der Wiel/Philips Lighting) and HR 14 October 2005, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AU2235 (City Tax). 
67 Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/446 and DAMHW Strik, Grondslagen 
bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid: een maatpak voor de board room, Uitgave vanwege het Insti-
tuut voor Ondernemingsrecht deel 73 (2010) 22 f and 30. 
68 P van Schilfgaarde, Van de BV en de NV (2013) 180. 
69 Art 7:400 DCC. 
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articles of association may limit this authority or assign it to another Corporate 
Body of the BV. A resolution with regard to a distribution has no effect as long 
as the Board of Directors has not given its approval to it. The Board of Directors 
shall only deny its approval if it knows or reasonably ought to foresee that the 
BV, after the distribution, will no longer be able to continue the payment of 
its due and collectable debts. If the BV, after a distribution, is not able to con-
tinue the payment of its due and collectable debts, then the Directors who knew 
this would result at the moment of the distribution or who reasonably ought to 
have foreseen that result at that moment, are jointly and severally liable to-
wards the BV for compensation of the deficit which has arisen on account of the 
distribution, raised by the statutory interest accruing as of the day of distribu-
tion. 
 
 
6. General statutory and non-statutory duties of the board and its members 
 
Subject to any restrictions under the articles of association, the Board of Direc-
tors is charged with the management of the Corporation (arts 2:129/239 DCC). 
The statute does not include an explicit explanation of the content of this duty 
of management (bestuurstaak). The Board of Directors is responsible for deter-
mining the strategies and policies of the Corporation, the Corporation’s compli-
ance with the law, representation of the Corporation, risk management, the fi-
nancing of the enterprise and the execution of resolutions of Corporate Bodies 
when relevant. Other general duties include bookkeeping (art 2:10 DCC), publi-
cation of the annual report (art 2:394 DCC) and provision of requested informa-
tion to the General Meeting unless a very important interest of the Corporation 
requires otherwise (arts 2:107(2)/217(2) DCC). In performing their duties Direc-
tors are guided by the interests of the Corporation and its affiliated enter-
prises (arts 2:129(5)/239(5) DCC) and the Board of Directors has management 
autonomy (bestuursautonomie), which means that within the framework of the 
law and the articles of association and the rules that are related thereto, the 
Board of Directors does not have to accept instructions with regard to the per-
formance of their duties.70 The acts of the Board of Directors are limited by the 
boundaries set by the objects clause included in the articles of association.  
The Board of Directors (whether in a two-tier structure or a one-tier struc-
ture) has a collective responsibility for the management of the Corporation. 
Each Director is responsible for the general affairs of the Corporation and  _____ 
70 HR 21 January 1955, ECLI:NL:HR:1955:AG2033; HR 13 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7970 
(ABN Amro); HR 9 July 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976 (ASMI). 
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should properly perform the tasks assigned to him (art 2:9 DCC). Other tasks can 
be assigned to individual Directors by or pursuant to the articles of association, 
as a result of which the assignment of duties can also take place through regula-
tions of the Board of Directors and informal agreements when a statutory basis 
exists. All Directors’ duties that have not been assigned to one or more Directors 
shall belong to the duties (tasks) of all Directors. In the one-tier board some 
tasks should be assigned to certain Directors. The duty to supervise the per-
formance of duties by the Executive Directors must be performed by a Non-
Executive Director. The chairmanship of the Board of Directors, the making of 
proposals for the appointment of a Director and the adoption of the remunera-
tion of the Executive Directors may not be assigned to an Executive Director. 
The DCGC 2016 (only applicable to listed Corporations) stipulates that the 
Board of Directors is responsible for the continuity of the Corporation and its af-
filiated enterprises. The Board of Directors focuses on long term value creation 
of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises, which includes considering the 
relevant interests of stakeholders.71 To achieve this, the Board of Directors cre-
ates a vision and a strategy and should take care of balanced and effective deci-
sion making.72 Attention will have to be paid to its risk profile and risk manage-
ment.73  Furthermore, the Board of Directors is responsible for creating a 
corporate culture that aims at long term value creation of the Corporation and 
its affiliated enterprises.74 The Board of Directors shall provide the Supervisory 
Board in good time with all information necessary for the exercise of the duties 
of the Supervisory Board and shall report related developments to and shall dis-
cuss the internal risk management and control systems with the Supervisory 
Board and the audit committee.75 
Supervisory Directors are responsible for the supervision of the policy of 
the Board of Directors and the general affairs of the Corporation and its affili-
ated enterprises and for providing the Board of Directors with advice. Super- 
visory Directors are also guided by the interests of the Corporation and its  
affiliated enterprises when performing their duties (art 2:140(2)/250(5) DCC). In 
executing their duties, the Supervisory Directors take into account the effective-
ness of the internal risk and control systems and the integrity and quality of the 
financial reports.76 The DCGC 2016 explicitly mentions that the Supervisory Di-
 _____ 
71 Principle 1.1 DCGC 2016. 
72 Principles 1.1 and 2.4 DCGC 2016. 
73 Principles 1.2–1.4 DCGC 2016. 
74 Principle 2.5 DCGC 2016. 
75 Principle 1.1, Best Practice 1.1.3 and Principle 1.4 DCGC 2016. 
76 Principle 1.5 DCGC 2016. 
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rectors shall be consulted by the Board of Directors when formulating the strat-
egy in order to create long-term value.77  
 
 
7. Nature and scope of the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
 
Articles 2:129/239 DCC require that Directors, while performing their function, 
should act in the interests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises. This 
implies that the duties do not extend beyond their professional life. Arti-
cle 2:8 DCC stipulates that those involved with the Corporation must behave to-
wards each other in accordance with what is required by standards of reason-
ableness and fairness and Directors specifically are responsible for a proper 
performance of the tasks conferred on them. 
Debate exists as to what the ‘interests of the Corporation and its affili-
ated enterprises’ entails. Legal commentators hold different views on how the 
interests of the Corporation are constructed. The ‘resultant theory’ holds that 
the interests of the Corporation equal the resultant of the consideration of inter-
ests (belangenafweging) of those that are involved with the Corporation. Which 
interests have to be taken into account and the weight that has to be given to 
these interests, depend on the circumstances.78 The ‘holistic theory’ perceives 
the interests of the Corporation as a stand-alone set of interests with its own 
character. The Corporation has its own interests aimed at a healthy existence, 
development and continuation with the objective of the Corporation in mind.79 
The interests of the Corporation should be constructed independently from the in-
terests of those involved with the Corporation. In the ‘perspective theory’, a com-
bination of the two aforementioned theories, the starting point is a stand-alone 
set of interests which is coloured by the different circumstances of the Corpora-
tion, for instance the solvent Corporation and the insolvent Corporation.80 
The Supreme Court has held that the content of the interests of the Corporation 
and its affiliated enterprises depends on the circumstances. In the event that an en-
 _____ 
77 Best Practice 1.1.3 DCGC 2016. 
78 EJJ Van der Heijden/WCL Van der Grinten (PJ Dortmond, ed), Handboek voor de naamloze 
en de besloten vennootschap (2013) no 231; Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 
2009/395; AF Verdam, Het vennootschappelijk belang méér dan ‘enlightened shareholder va-
lue’, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsrecht 2013/18, 93–101 and L Timmerman, Grondslagen van 
geldend ondernemingsrecht, Ondernemingsrecht 2009/2, 4–13. 
79 JMM Maeijer, Het belangenconflict in de naamloze vennootschap (inaugurele rede) (1964) 
5; Asser/Maeijer 2-III, no 293 and MM Mendel, Het vennootschappelijk belang mede in con-
cernverband beschouwd (oratie) (1989). 
80 WJ Slagter/BF Assink, Compendium Ondernemingsrecht (2013) 945 ff. 
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terprise is connected to the Corporation, the interests of the Corporation are as a 
rule mainly determined by the advancement of the continual success (bestendig 
succes) of this enterprise. Directors, when managing the Corporation, should care-
fully take into account – also on the grounds of art 2:8 DCC – the interests of all 
those that are involved with the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises and make 
sure that these interests are not unnecessarily or disproportionately harmed.81 
 
 
7.1. Case Study (safeguarding of interests) 
 
Facts (a) and (c) seems to be personal acts of D’s. Fact (b) appears to have taken 
place in his capacity as Director. There are no specific rules in Dutch company 
law that regulate the behaviour of Directors in private situations (facts (a) and 
(c)). It is not clear whether the other ‘well-known companies’ terminate their 
business relation with C-Corporation only because of these facts. It is also not 
clear under which conditions, for example a notice period, these companies end 
their agreements with C-Corporation. Therefore, it is not likely that C-Cor-
poration can succeed in holding D liable on the grounds of art 6:162 DCC for the 
termination based on facts (a) and (c) as a result of (i) causation problems as set 
forth and (ii) absence of an obligation to pay compensation on the grounds of 
art 6:162 DCC when the violated standard of behaviour is not aimed at offering 
protection to the claimant against the damage as suffered by the injured person 
(art 6:163 DCC). For the same reasons it would be difficult for shareholders to 
hold the Director liable on the grounds of art 6:162 DCC, which would be an ex-
ternal liability (see under Part III, below no 113 ff). 
Article 2:9 DCC could be used by the Corporation as a basis for Director li-
ability with regard to fact (b) (meeting with the Mafia while performing one’s 
duty as Director), as it could constitute mismanagement. However, it is doubt-
ful whether C-Corporation can successfully hold D liable on this ground due to 
problems with causality, although it could be argued that holding the meeting 
in itself constitutes mismanagement. 
 
 
7.2. Case Study (fiduciary duty and conflict of duties) 
 
A Director of a parent company is eligible to become a Supervisory Director  
of the subsidiary as long as the Supervisory Board can be sufficiently inde-
 _____ 
81 HR 4 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:804 (Inversiones cs/Cancun Holding I cs). 
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pendent of all interests relating to the Corporation and its affiliated enter-
prises and involved persons and groups including the interests of the parent 
company as a shareholder.82 This also applies to a subsidiary within the struc-
tuurregime.83 It is doubtful whether this is still the situation in case study 7.2.  
It could be the case that at the moment Director D was appointed as Supervisory 
Director of A-Corporation, the confidentiality agreement was not in place  
yet and the Supervisory Board was sufficiently independent. If the parent com-
pany could be qualified as a third party under the agreement, Director D should 
not have agreed to enter into such confidentiality agreement. If Director D nev-
ertheless entered into the confidentiality agreement, the question arises 
whether A-Corporation, which knows that D is also a Director of the parent 
company and as a result knows that D is not able to adhere to the secrecy obli-
gation in relation to the parent company, can hold D liable under the agree-
ment.  
In answering this question it is assumed that C-Corporation is a ‘third 
party’, regardless of the fact that C-Corporation holds a 50% share in A-Cor-
poration. The pecuniary loss is the result of C-Corporation not being informed 
by D of the economic situation of A-Corporation. As a Director of C-Corporation, 
D has the obligation to properly perform the tasks assigned to him with the in-
terests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises in mind (art 2:9 and 
arts 2:129/239 DCC). The case stipulates that D is also under obligation not to 
disclose any information he acquires in his capacity as Supervisory Director of 
A-Corporation. Pursuant to arts 2:149/259 DCC, Supervisory Directors’ liability is 
governed in the same way as Directors, keeping in mind that outcomes of the 
application may be different because the Supervisory Director has different 
tasks and responsibilities to a Director.84  
It is not certain whether D, in his capacity as Director of C-Corporation, can 
successfully be held liable by C-Corporation on the basis of art 2:9 DCC. The case 
study does not provide enough information to conclude a solid answer. Liabil-
ity due to mismanagement can only be established if the Board of Directors 
(or any individual member as they are jointly and severally liable) can be se-
verely held to blame, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.85 A 
possible answer could be as follows. It is known that C-Corporation suffers pe-
 _____ 
82 Hof Amsterdam (OK) 2 February 1989, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:1989 (Kodak). 
83 Bindend advies inzake de samenstelling van de raad van commissarissen van een  
dochter-structuurvennootschap, WCL van der Grinten, De Naamloze Vennootschap 55/5 (1977) 
106–112. 
84 Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/512. 
85 HR 25 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
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cuniary losses as a result of D’s conduct. A-Corporation was already in eco-
nomic difficulties. To avoid having C-Corporation affected by this situation and 
in the interest of C-Corporation, D should have informed C-Corporation of the 
information obtained in confidence as Supervisory Director of A-Corporation. 
Withholding that information, in other words: ‘observing secrecy’, was not in 
the interests of and was even disadvantageous to C-Corporation. D should have 
informed C-Corporation, despite the risk of being held liable by A-Cor-
poration in his capacity as Supervisory Director for not observing secrecy. 
However, if D is the only Director of C-Corporation, it is not likely that the Board 
of Directors of C-Corporation will take the decision to hold D liable, as D himself 
would have to represent the Corporation, unless the authority of representation 
in liability cases such as these is granted to someone outside the Board of Direc-
tors. It is likely that only after D is dismissed as Director, will D be held liable by 
C-Corporation. 
It is also not certain whether D, in his capacity as Supervisory Director of  
A-Corporation, can successfully be held liable by C-Corporation, based on tort 
(art 6:162 DCC). The question is whether D as a Supervisory Director of A-Cor-
poration should have informed C-Corporation as major shareholder in A-Corpo-
ration, also taking into account the interests of A-Corporation, its other share-
holder(s) and stakeholders.  
 
 
8. The extent of the board’s control and oversight 
 
Dutch law contains no specific obligations to exercise control or oversight 
over employees. Such a duty is included, however, in the primary task of Direc-
tors, which is to manage the Corporation (arts 2:129/239 DCC). Part of this task 
is to manage the internal affairs of the Corporation.86 Duties concerning control 
and oversight can be further distributed among the Directors by or pursuant to 
the articles of association (art 2:9 DCC). 
 
 
9. Responsibility for compliance monitoring 
 
See answer to questions 5 and 6. 
 
 
 _____ 
86 Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/390. 
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9.1. Case Study (liability of individual board members for disadvantageous 
transactions authorised by the majority in a board meeting) 
 
With regard to the first part of the question, the Board of Directors has not per-
formed its duties as is expected. Both D1 and D2 can be severely held to blame 
for their conduct. D3 however, could assert that he cannot be severely held to 
blame because he sufficiently opposed the transaction by voting against it and 
taking measures (trying to convince other Directors not to vote in favour of this 
transaction) to avert the consequences of that improper performance of duties. 
The conditions for avoiding liability pursuant to art 2:9 (2) DCC correspondingly 
apply. If, however, he did not try to persuade D1 and D2, he will not be able 
to exculpate himself. He is then liable for the full consequences of an improper 
performance of duties, unless, also in respect of the tasks assigned to the other 
Directors, he is able to demonstrate on other grounds that he is not severely to 
blame for it and neither has he been negligent in taking measures to avert the 
consequences of that improper performance of duties. 
 
 
10. Variation in duties and the standard of care expected of the board and its 
members under corporate, tort and contract law 
 
See answers to questions 5 and 6.  
 
 
10.1. Case Study (concretisation of the standard of duty; Business Judgment 
Rule) 
 
Dutch (corporate) law does not provide for specific measures or processes in 
addition to the general duties (as explained in relation to previous questions) 
that would need to be implemented in such a scenario. Directors should make 
informed decisions while performing their tasks. They should have a fair free-
dom to take decisions that involve risks. The DCGC 2016 provides that the Board 
of Directors is responsible for managing risks associated with the corporate 
strategy and corporate activities and that an internal risk management system 
must be in place.87 
 
 
 _____ 
87 Principle 1.2 DCGC 2016. 
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11. Factors influencing duties and the standard of care 
 
See answers to questions 5 and 13. 
 
 
11.1. Case Study (applicable standard of care) 
 
Liability would depend, amongst other circumstances, on the nature of the activi-
ties performed by the legal entity, the general risks resulting therefrom, the distri-
bution of duties within the Board of Directors, possible Corporation guidelines and 
the knowledge the Director had or should have had at the time of the alleged mis-
conduct. Liability must be established in the light of the insight and diligence 
that can be expected from a Director that is suited for his duties and fulfils 
these conscientiously.88 A Director should perform his tasks in a way a reasona-
bly capable and reasonably acting Director is supposed to perform the duties under 
the given circumstances.89 D, in his capacity as Director of B-Bank, is expected to be 
suited for his position as a manager of a bank and under these circumstances to be 
at least as skilled as an experienced professional manager.90 By concluding this 
adverse transaction for B-Bank, D has not performed duties in accordance with  
how a reasonably skilled and reasonably acting Director would perform his duties. 
 
 
12. The boardsʼ and its members’ duties and liability in the vicinity of 
insolvency 
 
Dutch law does not include specific duties or rules relating to wrongful trad-
ing. When performing their duties, Directors have to act in line with the inter-
ests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises. Directors will take into  
account several interests such as shareholders’ interests, creditor interests, em-
ployee interests etc. Dutch law does not provide for a formal change of attitude 
towards the consideration of the interests in case of insolvency. Some legal 
commentators argue that in the case that bankruptcy cannot be avoided any-
more and positive future prospects are absent (feitelijke insolventie), the inter-
ests of the Corporation are determined by the interests of the creditors.91 They 
 _____ 
88 HR 25 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
89 HR 8 April 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AS5010 (Laurus). 
90 HR 10 January 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
91 TT van Zanten/BF Assink, Art 2:9 BW in faillissement: tijd voor herwaardering, Tijdschrift 
voor Insolventierecht (TvI) 2008, 25. 
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find an argument for this view in the new provision relating to (dividend) pay-
ments as discussed in the answer to questions 20, 26 and nos 95–96. 
 
 
13. Impact of selection criteria on duties and the standard of care 
 
Restrictions do not affect the standard of duty of care applicable to the 
Board of Directors or its individual Directors. In the performance of duties, the 
Director must direct attention to the interests of the Corporation and its affili-
ated enterprises and bears responsibility for the proper performance of such du-
ties (art 2:9 and arts 2:129(5)/239(5) DCC). Additional requirements imposed by 
the Corporation do not alter this statutory duty of care.92 The Supreme Court has 
held recently in a case relating to a joint venture-BV that every director has to be 
guided by the interests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises despite 
the fact that the Director has been appointed by or on proposal of the General 
Meeting of holders of shares of a certain type (class) or indication. This will not 
change when shareholders are closely involved with the Corporation or when 
the articles of association determine that the Board of Directors has to follow the 
instructions of another Corporate Body of the Corporation.93 See Part I for re-
strictions on the eligibility of candidate Directors. When considering the duty of 
care of a Director in Dutch law, the knowledge and skills of an ‘average Di-
rector’ (maatman-bestuurder) given the circumstances has to be taken into ac-
count as the standard to assess the conduct of Directors in liability cases. These 
skills and knowledge form the objective lower boundary. If a Director has spe-
cific knowledge and skills, this circumstance could be taken into account when 
his conduct is being assessed.94 
 
 
14. Compensation for damage to the corporation’s property or to share-
holders’/partners’ property 
 
As discussed above, misconduct on the part of a Director causes several and 
joint liability for all Directors if one or more can be severely held to blame, save 
 _____ 
92 HR 25 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
93 HR 4 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:804 (Inversiones cs/Cancun Holding I cs). 
94 WJ Slagter/BF Assink, Compendium Ondernemingsrecht (2013) 1018 f and Hof Amsterdam 
5 February 1998, Jurisprudentie Onderneming & Recht (JOR) 1999/54 (Van Rossum/Grapper-
haus qq) and Hof Amsterdam 21 September 2010, JOR 2011/40 (Lamvers/Stichting Freule Lauta 
van Aysma). 
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for exculpation (art 2:9 DCC). Claims for damages can be made by the Corpora-
tion itself or liquidators (in the case of bankruptcy). Derivative suits are not 
possible under Dutch law.  
In principle, derivative damage (afgeleide schade) to share value will not be 
honored by the Court unless the shareholder can demonstrate a violation of the 
relevant standard of care.95 This is because loss or damage has adverse effects on 
the Corporation and its property, consequently, the Corporation (a legal entity that 
can sue and be sued) is the only party that can and should be able to claim compen-
sation.96 If a shareholder can demonstrate a violation of the relevant standard of 
care (art 2:9 DCC) or tort (art 6:162 DCC),97 the claim for compensation may be suc-
cessful. Derivative damage must not be confused with derivative suit.98  
Lastly, art 2:343(4) DCC, the provision that governs the forced takeover of 
shares in inquiry proceedings, provides the Enterprise Court with the discre-
tionary authority, if requested by the shareholder, to apply a fair (reasonable) in-
crease of the price of the shares in connection with the conduct of the defendant or 
of others than the defendant, if it is plausible that this conduct has resulted in a 
decrease of the price of the shares which are to be transferred, and this decrease 
should not or not entirely remain for account of the plaintiff. 
 
 
14.1. Case Study (compensation for damage to the corporation’s property or to 
shareholders’/partners’ property) 
 
In the first situation C-Corporation itself could claim damages from D for his 
misconduct since it bears the cost of this damage (€ 100,000). C-Corporation 
would base such a claim on arts 2:9 and 2:239(5) DCC. S1 and S2 own the shares 
of C-Corporation but that property right is not violated by a decrease in the 
value of those shares due to the misconduct of D.99 S1 and S2 in their capacity as 
shareholders have as such no legal basis to assert their claim, an exception to 
this is discussed below (cf no 64). S1 and S2 can use corporate procedures as 
provided for by Dutch corporate law, pressuring C-Corporation to initiate pro-
ceedings against D, for example through a General Meeting resolution.  _____ 
95 HR 2 December 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1564 (Poot/ABP). 
96 BF Assink, Vraagtekens rond afgeleide schade, in: PJ van der Korst/R Abma/GTMJ Raaijma-
kers (eds), Handboek Onderneming en Aandeelhouder (2012) 306. 
97 Van der Korst, Abma & Raaijmakers/Assink (2012) (fn 96)307. 
98 Van der Korst, Abma & Raaijmakers/Assink (2012) (fn 96) 339; L Timmerman, Pragmatisch 
denken over afgeleide schade, Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie (WPNR) 
2013/6992, 115–118. 
99 HR 2 December 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1564 (Poot/ABP). 
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Shareholders that suffered a decrease in their share value as the result of 
misconduct of the Director of their Corporation can assert claims against that 
Director for compensation. In principle, the Court will not honour such claims 
for compensation of derivative damage, unless a specific statutory provision 
that protects the interest of the shareholder has been violated or the share-
holder can demonstrate a violation of the relevant standard of care vis-à-vis 
the shareholder in private (eg via tort, art 6:162 DCC).100 This is different from 
claiming compensation for direct damage (which also causes decreased share 
value), for example due to misleading information regarding the prospects of 
the enterprises affiliated with the Corporation, which has an influence on the 
market value of the shares. The Director has not violated a specific statutory 
rule. This case study does not lead to the conclusion that the Director has vio-
lated the relevant standard of care vis-à-vis S1 and S2. 
 
 
14.2. Case Study (compensation for damage to the corporation’s property or to 
shareholders’/partners’ property due to delay in filing for insolvency) 
 
The prerequisite for a (legal) person to open insolvency proceedings is found in 
art 1 Insolvency Act (‘IA’): the debtor must have stopped paying his debts. Di-
rectors of a Corporation, which does not pay its debts, are not obligated in any 
way to open insolvency proceedings or file for bankruptcy. If the Directors 
want to file for bankruptcy, the Board of Directors needs to be assigned by the 
General Meeting to do so, unless the articles of association provide otherwise 
(arts 2:136/246 DCC).  
See the answer to question 12. Although Directors are not obliged to file for 
bankruptcy, it could be argued that continuing the business without paying 
debts, hoping for better days, could in case of imminent insolvency lead to a 
lack of proper management. If D knows or should have known that bank-
ruptcy would be unavoidable, it could be misconduct when he continues with 
conducting business activities. It could be argued that in such a case D should 
have filed for insolvency on 1 January, the liquidator could then hold D liable 
on the basis of art 2:9 DCC for the increase of the debts or decrease of the as-
sets.101 See the answer to question 5 for the requirements. However, the case 
study does not provide enough information about the business situation and 
opportunities in the period 1 January to 1 June to determine whether there was 
imminent insolvency. If doubt existed as to whether D could still turn around  _____ 
100 HR 2 December 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1564 (Poot/ABP). 
101 HR 13 January 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZC1605 (Sobi/Hurks). 
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the situation for the benefit of the Corporation, D would have to be granted 
some discretion in order to safeguard the Corporation.102 The determination of 
the moment that imminent insolvency exists is not an easy task. The Supreme 
Court has held that with regard to the determination of the date of inevitability 
of the bankruptcy, the date should be set in favour of the Director.103 
S1 and S2, in their capacity as shareholders, can assert a claim for dam-
ages, on the basis of tort (art 6:162 DCC). The likelihood of success however, is 
low. Shareholders are not required to provide capital larger than the value of 
their shares nor are they liable for the conduct of the Corporation (save for ex-
ceptions) (arts 2:64/175 DCC). The downside is that shareholders are last in line 
with regard to receiving payments in case of bankruptcy (arts 3:277/278 DCC). 
On 1 January, S1 and S2 would probably not have seen any payments, as a result 
of which their position on 1 June has not worsened or improved. In other words, 
the misconduct of D affected the Corporation’s creditors, not its share-
holders. Consequently, S1 and S2 will probably be unsuccessful in their claim. 
 
 
15. Limitation periods 
 
Like most claims, the claim against a Director must be asserted within 5 years 
after the damage (regardless of when the damaging act actually occurred) and 
the liable person have become known to the injured party (the Corporation in 
this case) (art 3:310 DCC). In any case, the Corporation loses its claim 20 years 
after the damage, even if the liable person/damage remains unknown. Both pe-
riods are extended by 6 months (arts 3:320 and 3:321(d) DCC) after the resig-
nation of an allegedly liable Director.104 This extended period was introduced 
to resolve the issue of Directors preventing possible claims against them-
selves.105  
 
 
15.1. Case Study (suspension/interruption of the limitation period) 
 
As stated in the answer to question 15, any claim asserted by a Corporation 
against one of its Directors can be made within 5 years after both the damage 
 _____ 
102 Rechtbank (Rb) Amsterdam 22 August 2001, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2001:AG3872. 
103 HR 21 December 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AD4499 (Sobi/Hurks II). 
104 Asser/Bartels & Van Mierlo 3-IV 2013/558. 
105 See further: BM Katan, ‘Je wist toch dat ik je bedonderde?’ De verjaring van de vordering 
van de rechtspersoon op zijn bestuurder, Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht 2017-3-4, 88–95. 
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and the person responsible for the damage have become known, with a maxi-
mum of 20 years after the misconduct and extended by a period of 6 months af-
ter the (former) Director’s misconduct. Thus, the first situation does not change 
anything with respect to the limitation of C’s liability. The knowledge of D is al-
located to, or presumed to be known by, C-Corporation, due to the fact that D is 
a Director of C-Corporation. There is a debate going on relating to this issue.106 
In the alternative, D moved from the Board of Directors to the Supervi-
sory Board. By doing so, the extended 6 month-period went into effect. After 
these 6 months, claims against D can only be asserted if the 5 or 20 year limita-
tion still applies. In the case of one-tier boards, the rules that apply to the Board 
of Directors in a two-tier structure also apply to the one-tier board.  
 
 
B. Modification of the general conditions for liability 
 
16. Adapting the scope and content of the board’s and its members’ duties 
 
The general duties are described in the answer to question 6. The content and scope 
of Directors’ duties can be changed pursuant to the articles of association. They 
may be limited (arts 2:129/139 DCC) or expanded (arts 2:107(1)/217(1) DCC). How-
ever, the right to change the scope of the duties of Directors is not unlimited, they 
must be able to perform their primary task, which is to manage the Corporation. In 
addition, deviation from provisions included in Book 2 of the DCC (legislation for 
legal entities) is only permitted if the law provides the possibility to deviate (art 2:25 
DCC) or when there is a reasonable and objective justification for the deviation as a 
result of which the deviation is permitted on the basis of the principle of reason-
ableness and fairness (art 2:8 DCC).107 The purpose clause in the articles of asso-
ciation defines the scope of the authorities of the Board of Directors. 
The division of duties within the board may be altered by or pursuant to 
the articles of association. This means that the alteration can either be in-
cluded in the articles of association in detail or they may provide for alternative 
ways to change the scope of duties, for example through resolutions or con-
tracts.108 With regard to the one-tier board, arts 2:129a(1)/239a(1) DCC list a 
number of duties that can only be assigned to Non-Executive Directors: supervi-
sion of Executive Directors, chairmanship of the Board of Directors, proposing 
new Directors and determining Executive Director remuneration. By or pursuant  _____ 
106 Katan, Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht 2017-3-4, 88–95. 
107 HR 31 December 1993, NJ 1994/436 (Verenigde Bootlieden). 
108 Huizink (fn 41) art 9 Boek 2 BW, aant 12.1. 
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to the articles of association, it can be determined that decisions by a Director 
within their scope of duties has legal effect (arts 2:129a(3)/139a(3) DCC). 
 
 
16.1. Case Study (distribution of competences) 
 
As stated in art 2:9 par 2 DCC, Directors are jointly and severally liable. A di-
rector can exculpate himself when he can prove that he cannot be severely held 
to blame, in the light of tasks assigned to other Directors, and that he has not 
been negligent in taking measures to avert the consequences of the improper 
performance of duties. Assuming that the transaction entered into by D2 quali-
fies as improper management and given that D2 is solely responsible for foreign 
affairs and D1 is solely responsible for national matters, it is likely that D1 can 
disprove severe blameworthiness on his part. He has then to prove that he 
has not been negligent as regards taking measures to avert the consequences of 
the improper performance of duties by D2 (art 2:9 DCC). In answering this ques-
tion it is presumed that each Director has the power of representation and that 
the representation is not limited in any way (art 2: 130/240 DCC).  
Alternative 1: If such task allocation is provided for in the articles of asso-
ciation, D2 acts in violation of these. The situation that a Director has acted in 
violation of a provision of the articles of association that protect the Corpo-
ration constitutes a tantamount circumstance which, in principle, constitutes 
mismanagement.109 D2 can thus be held liable on the basis of art 2:9 DCC. As 
all Directors are jointly and severally liable, D1 is liable in principle as well. 
However, given the fact that D2 secretly disregarded the task allocation, D1 is 
likely to disprove serious blameworthiness on his part. He has then to prove 
that he was not negligent as regards taking measures to avert the consequences 
of the improper performance of duties by D2. 
Alternative 2: If the articles of association allow for this form of contractual 
task assignment, this constitutes a valid assignment of duties. However, the cir-
cumstance that Directors, by way of separate agreement, have agreed on a spe-
cific division of tasks does not remove these tasks from their collective liabil-
ity pursuant to arts 2:9 and 2:129(5)/239(5) DCC. The tasks are not statutorily 
separated. Still, such an agreement can constitute an important indication in dis-
proving a Director’s severe blameworthiness.110 D1 can disprove severe blame-
worthiness on his part, provided that D1 has not been negligent in taking measures  
to avert the consequences of that improper performance of duties (art 2:9 DCC).   _____ 
109 HR 29 November 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE7011 (Berghuizer/Parpierfabriek). 
110 Rb Midden-Nederland 19 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:CA3225 (Landis). 
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16.2. Case Study (authorisation of unlawful conduct) 
 
Articles of association in violation of the law, boni mores (goede zeden) or the 
public order are not binding (art 3:40 DCC). The fact that the corporation 
authorised the illegal acts under (a)–(f) – whether this was expressively or not – 
does not change their illegality. Directors that act in violation of the law can be 
held liable on the basis of art 2:9 DCC (by the Corporation) or art 6:162 DCC (by 
the Shareholders, the Corporation, and third parties).111 Rules of justification 
may apply. 
Alternative: As mentioned, articles of association in violation of the law are 
not binding. D cannot be held liable in the alternative situation for not following 
the non-binding provisions of the articles of association. 
 
 
17. Adapting the standard of care expected of the board and its members 
 
As art 3:40 DCC states: ‘A juridical act that violates a statutory provision of  
mandatory law is null and void’. Article 2:9 DCC is mandatory law (art 2:25 
DCC), and includes the standard of severe blameworthiness. Changing  
the standard of care would also undermine relevant case law. A-Corporation 
and its Directors cannot agree to the anticipatory exoneration or limitation of  
liability. 
 
 
17.1. Case Study (reduction of due diligence standard) 
 
See answer to question 17. 
 
 
18. Other limitations or exclusion of liability  
 
See answer to question 17. 
 
 
18.1. Case Study (other limitation of liability) 
 
See answer to question 17. 
 _____ 
111 DAMHW Strik, Commentaar op Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 2 art 9. 
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C. Authorisation and instructions by other organs of the 
company (in particular by the shareholders’ meeting) 
 
19. Powers and responsibilities in authorising and instructing the board 
 
Resolutions of the Board of Directors may only be subject to authorization  
by another Corporate Body if the articles of association provide for this 
(arts 2:129(3)/239(3) DCC). Dutch law does not specify what Corporate Bodies can 
be afforded such power, it can be the General Meeting, the meeting of holders of 
shares of a certain type (class) or indication, the Supervisory Board or the joint  
meeting of the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board (arts 2:78a/189a DCC).  
Regarding the NV, the General Meeting is afforded power of authoriza-
tion in the field of certain specific issues, such as changes in the identity or 
character of the Corporation, (art 2:107a(1) DCC). Article 2:107a DCC provides a 
non-exhaustive list of decisions that are at least imperatively subject to the ap-
proval of the General Meeting. This list includes matters such as (a) the transfer 
of the enterprise or almost the entire enterprise to a third party; (b) entering into 
or exiting a collaboration of the Corporation or a subsidiary with another legal 
entity or Corporation when this would have a substantial impact on the Corpo-
ration; and (c) acquiring or disposing of a significant investment in another le-
gal entity with a value of at least one-third of the value of the assets according to 
the (consolidated) balance sheet of the Corporation. However, the absence of 
the General Meeting’s approval on a resolution, as referred to, does not affect 
the authority of representation of the Board of Directors or the Directors 
(art 2:107a(2) DCC). The act of filing for bankruptcy is also a decision that must 
be approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders (arts 2:136/246 DCC).  
If a BV or NV, not meeting the criteria of a ‘large’ Corporation within the 
meaning of the structuurregime (arts 2:153/263 DCC), has a Supervisory Board 
in place, the Supervisory Board can be afforded additional duties and powers 
via the articles of association (arts 2:140/250 DCC). In the case of a ‘large’ Corpo-
ration within the meaning of the structuurregime, (arts 2:158/268 DCC), the Su-
pervisory Board is mandatory and has statutory authorities of approval. Articles 
2:164/274 DCC provide a list of resolutions that need the approval of the Super-
visory Board. The absence of the Supervisory Board’s approval on a resolution 
does not affect the authority of representation of the Board of Directors or the 
Directors (arts 2:164/274 (2) DCC). 
The one-tier system is largely governed by the rules applicable to the 
Board of Directors. With regard to the list mentioned in arts 2:164/274 DCC, the 
authority of approval is vested in the Non-Executive Directors. Approval of the 
majority of the Non-Executive Directors is required (arts 2:164a/274a DCC). 
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19.1. Case Study (authorisation of an apparently disadvantageous transaction)  
 
D, in his capacity as Director of C-Corporation and complying with the articles of 
association, concluded a valid transaction. Despite the authorization of the 
competent organ, D’s conduct is not acceptable because it is not in the inter-
ests of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises (arts 2:129(5)/239(5) DCC). 
Acting with the insight and diligence that can be reasonably expected from a Di-
rector that is suited to his duties and fulfils these conscientiously, D should not 
have concluded the disadvantageous transaction.112 Severe blameworthiness 
can be established. Consequently, D can be held liable for this misconduct by 
the Corporation on the basis of art 2:9 DCC. The authorization may cause the 
members of the corporate organ to be liable for the damage that the disadvanta-
geous transaction created.113 
Alternative 1: For the liability of D see above. The situation that D has not 
disclosed the fact that the transaction would be disadvantageous to the corpo-
rate organ – although he was aware of this – strengthens the argument that D 
has not properly performed his duty as he should have properly and in good 
time informed the corporate organ. It would be difficult to hold the members of 
the corporate organ liable, as the organ was not informed about the disadvanta-
geous character of the transaction nor would it have been aware of this charac-
ter after a proper fulfilment of its duties. 
Alternative 2: If the corporate organ has been negligent, the liability of its 
members depends on the type of corporate organ that is competent. If a Super-
visory Board is the competent organ, its members may not have properly per-
formed their duties (see question 6) and the same provisions that apply to the 
Board of Directors apply to the Supervisory Board. In this case, art 2:9 DCC is 
relevant. If the General Meeting is the competent organ, liability would rarely 
arise. For the liability of D, see above. 
 
 
20. Instructions to the board or individual directors to implement certain 
management decisions 
 
In principle, the Board of Directors is charged with the management of the Cor-
poration. If the articles of association of a BV so provide, the specified Cor-
porate Body may instruct the Board of Directors. The Corporate Body may be 
the General Meeting, the meeting of holders of shares of a certain type (class) or  _____ 
112 HR 10 January 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2243 (Staleman/Van der Ven). 
113 Rb Amsterdam 6.3.1911, W9133 and Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten (fn 78) no 231, 589. 
86 
87 
88 
89 
338 | IS Wuisman and RA Wolf 
 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
indication, the Supervisory Board and the joint meeting of the Supervisory 
Board and Board of Directors (arts 2:189a in conjunction with 239(4) DCC). Dif-
ferences of opinions exist regarding the question of whether the Supervisory 
Board would be a suitable Corporate Body to give instructions due to its task of 
supervision of the Board of Directors. This discussion is extended to the joint 
meeting of the Supervisory Board and the Board of Directors, because of the par-
ticipation of the Board of Directors in this Corporate Body. Furthermore, there is 
debate as to the meeting of holders of shares without voting rights, because the 
right of instruction would give this group an important say in the management 
of the Corporation, which is not in line with shares without voting rights.114 The 
Board of Directors is compelled to follow the instructions, unless these are in 
conflict with the interests of the Corporation and the affiliated enterprises 
(art 2:239(4) DCC). 
If the articles of association of an NV so provide, the specified Corporate 
Body may give instructions relating to general policy, which is to be pursued in 
areas identified in the articles of association (art 2:129(4) DCC). If such instruc-
tions would not be in the interests of the Corporation, the Board of Directors can 
rely on art 2:129(5) DCC if it considers it inappropriate to execute the order. This 
seems to imply a substantial difference between the instructions when the Cor-
poration is a BV (concrete instructions) and when it is an NV (general instruc-
tions). In practice, however, this does not seem to be an important difference as 
there have rarely been cases in which the type of instruction was the issue of 
debate. Normally, the debate is focused on the question of whether the Board of 
Directors materially should have followed the instructions in the case of a group 
of companies.115  
Instructions may not violate the law, boni mores (goede zeden) or the 
public order (art 3:40 DCC) and have to be within the boundaries of reason-
ableness and fairness as included in art 2:8 DCC. Furthermore, the provisions in 
the articles of association limit the scope of the instructions. Instructions in vio-
lation of the articles of association are non-binding. This means that the divi-
sion of powers as laid down in the statute and the articles of association have to 
be taken into account. Moreover, the purpose of the Corporation (which may be 
broader than the description in the articles of association) limits the right of in-
struction. 
Groups (of Corporations) are not provided with special rules since group 
law in the Netherlands has not been codified. Without prejudice to the interests  _____ 
114 See for an overview of these discussions: JA Terstegge, Instructierecht en de Flex-BV, 
WPNR 2014/7011, 259–269. 
115 Ibid. 
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of each parent/subsidiary and the responsibility that its Directors and Share-
holders have towards their own Corporation and the Group, parent Corpora-
tions can bindingly instruct their subsidiaries. This can, for example, be pro-
vided for in the articles of incorporation. This is not just a right but also a 
responsibility of the parent Corporation; it must supervise and instruct the sub-
sidiary and take action if the subsidiary does not meet its obligations or gets 
into financial distress. In addition to the right of instruction, the General Meet-
ing also has the power of instruction as the General Meeting may discharge Di-
rectors, which gives them leverage and consequently influence over the Board 
of Directors. 
 
 
20.1. Case Study (instructions regarding illegal/disadvantageous 
management decisions) 
 
See the answer to question 17. D has no obligation to follow instructions of this 
kind. 
 
 
20.2. Case Study (instructions regarding distribution of profits) 
 
With regard to the BV, art 2:216 DCC is an internal liability provision relating to 
distributions, which was introduced in 2012. While the appropriation of profits 
is determined by the General Meeting, the Board of Directors must approve 
the resolution on the distributions according to art 2:216 DCC. The Board of Di-
rectors only should have rejected the decision if it knows or should have known 
that the distribution(s) would cause the Corporation’s inability to pay its due 
debts. In the Parliamentary history, the time period that has to be taken into ac-
count is about one year, but the Board of Directors has to take into account all 
available relevant information.116 A resolution with regard to a distribution has 
no effect as long as the Board of Directors has not given its approval to it. In the 
event that the Corporation is not able to pay its due debts after the distribution 
and the Directors knew or should have known this at the time of the distribu-
tion, they are jointly and severally liable for the deficit that is created as a re-
sult of the distribution (see also question 5). 
There is debate regarding the question of the relation between the interests 
of the Corporation and its affiliated enterprises (which directors have to keep in 
 _____ 
116 Kamerstukken I 20011/12, 31 058, no E, 15. 
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mind when performing their duties) and the requirement of ‘foreseeable inabil-
ity to pay its due debts’, which refers to the creditors’ interests. The interests of 
the Corporation are broader than only the creditors’ interests, the interests of 
(minority) shareholders and for instance employees also have to be taken into 
account. In literature, some commentators support the opinion that also with 
regard to art 2:216 DCC, Directors should have these broader interests of the 
Corporation in mind. Reasonable arguments, eg investments in the Corpora-
tion, could be a reason to decide to reserve profits rather than distribute them to 
shareholders.117 The fact that machinery would become obsolete would prevent 
the Directors from giving their approval to the resolution of the General Meeting 
because the capital would have to be used for the acquisition of new machinery. 
Others state that the decision about the approval should only be based on the 
explicit requirement of art 2:216 DCC. In this case they would argue that the 
Board of Directors would have to approve the distributions since as a result of 
the distributions only the profits are reduced and the Corporation would still be 
able to pay its due and collectable debts. Additionally, if shareholders received 
dividends while they knew or should have known about the Corporation’s in-
ability to pay its debts after distribution, they are obligated to return the pay-
ments (art 2:216(3) DCC).  
As far as the articles of association do not provide otherwise, the NV’s profits 
are for the benefit of the shareholders. Profits are distributed (after the annual re-
port is established) to the shareholders if the NV has sufficient equity (more equity 
than the paid-up share capital and legally and statutorily imposed reserves com-
bined) (art 2:105(2) DCC). Shareholders aware of dividend payments contrary to 
art 2:105(2) DCC are obliged to return these payments to the NV (art 2:105(8) DCC). 
The payment qualifies as an undue payment (art 6:203 DCC). Unlike with the BV, 
unlawful dividend payments by the NV must be returned, regardless of whether 
the dividend payment affected the NV or not.118 If, however, the Shareholders can 
demonstrate that they received the dividend payments in good faith, they are 
not obliged to return the payments (art 2:105(8) DCC).119  
 
 
20.3. Case Study (instructions regarding covert return of contributions) 
 
D, in his capacity as Director of C-Corporation, can be held liable for the trans-
action concluded by C-Corporation. His conduct constitutes mismanagement  _____ 
117 HR 12 July 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9145, note by B Bier § 2. 
118 Huizink (fn 41) art 2:105 BW, aant 5a. 
119 Hof Amsterdam 10 June 1993, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:1993:AC1513. 
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(art 2:9 DCC). However, if D were to be sole Director of C-Corporation, he would 
probably not start legal proceedings on behalf of the Corporation against him-
self. If a new Board of Directors was appointed, it could take the initiative to sue 
D as former Director on behalf of C-Corporation. A claim of one or more of the 
Shareholders would probably not be successful, as each shareholder was 
aware of the situation and a valid resolution was adopted by the General Meet-
ing. 
In the case of an NV, a juridical act performed by the Corporation without 
approval of the General Meeting or without an audit report may be nullified on 
behalf of the Corporation when the juridical act implies the acquisition of assets 
that belonged to a founder one year before the establishment of the Corporation 
or afterwards belonged to a founder and has been performed within two years 
after registration in the Commercial Register. The audit report states that the 
value of the asset(s) to be received/purchased by the Corporation determined by 
generally accepted valuation methods equals at least the value of the counter 
performance by the Corporation. If the conditions in the case study were simi-
lar, this rule would be applicable. 
Alternative 1: D can still be held liable (on the same grounds as mentioned 
above) by C-Corporation (not the shareholders); he should not have given in to 
the pressure of S1. Shareholders S2 and S3 cannot be held liable; the ultimate 
responsibility is with D. S1 could be held liable on the basis of tort (art 6:162 
DCC) by S2 and S3. However, it is doubtful whether this would be successful. 
Alternative 2: C-Corporation can hold D liable, as stated above. The provi-
sions for conflicts of interest include a ‘decision-making rule’ (art 2:129(5)/239(6) 
DCC). These provisions stipulate that a Director does not participate in the de-
liberations and decision-making if he has a direct or indirect personal interest 
therein that is contrary to the interests of the Corporation and its affiliated en-
terprises. If, as a result, no Board resolution can be passed, the Supervisory 
Board of C-Corporation can pass the resolution. In the absence of a Supervisory 
Board or if the Supervisory Board cannot pass a resolution due to conflicts of in-
terest of the Supervisory Directors, the resolution shall be passed by the General 
Meeting, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. When the Board of 
Directors passes a resolution in violation of the conflict of interest rule, the reso-
lution may be annulled on the basis of violation of the required statutory proc-
ess (art 2:15(1)(a) DCC). However, this does not change the validity of the trans-
action when the Corporation has been validly represented. The value of S’s 
shareholding is reduced as a consequence of this transaction. S could attempt to 
assert a claim on the basis of derivative damage (discussion of which is in ques-
tion 14). If S can demonstrate a violation of the relevant standard of care, eg via 
tort (art 6:162 DCC), it may be successful in claiming compensation. 
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20.4. Case Study (instructions regarding covert return of contributions within 
a group of companies) 
 
The resolution of the General Meeting of M-Corporation is an instruction to 
the directors of C-Corporation. If C-Corporation is a BV, the articles of associa-
tion of the Corporation may state that the Directors must act according to the in-
structions of another Corporate Body (in this case the General Meeting of C-
Corporation). Directors must follow the instructions, unless the instruction is 
contrary to the interests of the Corporation (art 2:239(4) DCC). C-Corporation is 
part of a group and therefore the Directors must also take the interests of the 
group as a whole into account, although the interests of the group may not be 
decisive.120 If D grants A-Corporation a loan and the instruction is contrary to the 
interests of C-Corporation, which is likely in this case,121 C-Corporation itself 
could bring a law suit against its Director D to claim damages (based on art 2:9 
DCC). Alternative 1 does not change this assessment.  
In order to hold M-Corporation liable in tort vis-à-vis C-Corporation, or the 
creditors of C-Corporation, the inter-group relation must be assessed, for ex-
ample, to what extent has M-Corporation the power to control C-Corporation? Is 
there a duty of care of M-Corporation towards the creditors of C-Corporation and 
if so did M-Corporation breach this duty? At which particular moment in time is 
M-Corporation aware of the financial difficulty of C-Corporation?122 M-Cor-
poration holds all shares in C-Corporation, so it is likely that M-Corporation has 
the power to control C-Corporation. Actual power of control generates a duty 
of care on the part of M-Corporation towards the creditors of C-Cor-
poration,123 which is activated the moment M-Corporation should have foreseen 
that the creditors of C-Corporation are disadvantaged due to lack of assets.124  _____ 
120 HR 21 December 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AD4499 (Sobi/Hurks II) and HR 26 October 2001, 
NJ 2002, 94 (Juno). 
121 In a case where a similar situation occurred, however in relation to granting a guarantee, 
the circumstances that led to such a conclusion were that the subsidiary that had been re-
quested to provide a guarantee within the group already had a substantial amount of loans 
outstanding within the group without adequate security rights, the affiliated corporation that 
was supposed to receive the loan was in a financial situation that is comparable with suspen-
sion of payment (surséance van betaling) and had equity with a negative value. As a result, 
there were insufficient advantages as compared to the burden of the guarantee, the call in of 
the guarantee was not implausible and the continuity of the subsidiary was at risk: Rb‘s-
Gravenhage (vzr) 7 August 2002, KG 02/947, JOR 2002/173 (NEM/Babcock). 
122 HR 19 February 1988, ECLI:NL:HR:1988:AG5761 and HR 21 December 2001, ECLI:NL:HR: 
2001:AD4499 (Sobi/Hurks II). 
123 HR 25 September 1981, NJ 2982, 443 (Osby). 
124 HR 19 February 1988, NJ 1988 (Albada Jelgersma II). 
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This seems to be the case at the moment M-Corporation instructed Director D to 
grant A-Corporation an interest-free loan. Given the fact that thereby M-Cor-
poration breached its duty of care, M-Corporation becomes liable in dam-
ages, based on tort (art 6:162 DCC). 
Alternative 2: the facts presented in alternative 2 are relevant facts in estab-
lishing the liability of both D and M-Corporation, ie it is more likely that the 
court will hold D as well as M-Corporation liable on the grounds as set forth. 
Annulment of the loan, other than in bankruptcy, is not possible. In the case of 
bankruptcy, the appointed liquidator can annul the transaction if certain re-
quirements are met, such as (i) the transaction is not compulsory, (ii) the transac-
tion is disadvantageous and (iii) both parties knew or could have known that the 
transaction was disadvantageous (art 42 IL). Even compulsory transactions can be 
annulled if the other party at that moment knew bankruptcy was already filed or 
payment of a due debt was a result of consultation between both parties with the  
objective of favoring the recipient in relation to other creditors (art 47 IL). 
 
 
D. Waiver of and agreement regarding indemnity 
 
21. Right and scope of waiver against board and its members 
 
A waiver with which the Corporation in principle renounces its right to take re-
course against Directors (decharge/kwijting) on the basis of mismanagement 
(art 2:9 DCC) is possible but is not included in statutory law. The waiver may also 
cover liability on the basis of art 2:216 DCC as regards distributions to sharehold-
ers. The scope of this waiver is limited as it only stretches to information known 
to the Corporation and its shareholders, although that knowledge is presumed 
to be more than just the annual report as it also includes information that has 
been provided by the Board of Directors to the General Meeting outside the annual 
meeting of Shareholders and with an exception relating to fraudulent acts that, as 
a result of manipulation of the report, are not part of the annual report but known 
to the Shareholder(s) as a result of his/their double role, ie being the Director(s) 
that performed the fraudulent acts.125 In bankruptcy, the waiver also protects the 
Director against claims of the liquidator on the basis of art 2:9 DCC but not against 
claims on the basis of arts 2:138/248 DCC. The waiver does not affect external li-
ability towards third parties, which cannot be limited. The waiver also concerns 
other claims for liability, for example based on tort, which may no longer be 
 _____ 
125 HR 25 June 2010 and JOR 2010/227 (De Rouw/Dingemans qq). 
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initiated against Directors by the Corporation. The General Meeting can de-
clare waivers in the name of the Corporation; usually this is paired with the an-
nual meeting of Shareholders and the presentation of the annual report.126 When 
all Shareholders of a BV are also Directors of that BV, the signing of the annual  
report by all Directors and Supervisory Directors, subject to certain require- 
ments and only when the articles of association do not exclude this effect, is re-
garded to be the adoption of the annual report which is also regarded as a waiver 
(decharge/kwijting).127 In addition, the Corporation can enter into an agreement 
with a Director to grant a final waiver as part of an exit-agreement. As the Board of 
Directors is authorized to represent the Corporation, it will sign the agreement. 
The exiting Director with a personal interest cannot take part in the decision-
making (arts 2:129(6)/239(6) DCC) as a direct personal conflict of interests exists. It 
has been argued that the General Meeting has to make a resolution regarding the 
waiver before the agreement is signed, but it is unclear whether the absence of 
such resolution affects the right of the exiting Director to rely on his rights un-
der the exit agreement.128 This waiver (decharge/kwijting) is an ex post instru-
ment. It is not possible to exclude internal liability ex ante on the basis of art 2:9 
DCC (vrijwaring).129 
 
 
21.1. Case Study (waiver of right to pursue already incurred claims) 
 
See answer to question 21. The knowledge of the General Meeting that the acts of 
the Board of Directors can be qualified as mismanagement (or that it is foreseeable 
that these acts may be qualified as mismanagement) (but the waiver has neverthe-
less been granted) does not influence whether the Director may rely on the waiver 
subject to the requirements included in the answer to question 21. This is also the 
case when the Director has intentionally caused damage to the Corporation.130 
 _____ 
126 HR 17 June 1921, NJ 1921, 737, (Deen/Perlak); HR 20 June 1924, NJ 1924, 1107 (Truffino); HR 
10 January 1997, NJ 1997, 360 (Staleman/van de Ven); HR 20 October 1989, NJ 1990, 308 (Ellem) 
and HR 25 June 2010, JOR 2010/227 (De Rouw/Dingemans qq) and art 2:107/217 (1) DCC: CDJ Bul-
ten/N Kreileman, De Dans ontspringen door decharge? in: G van Solinge et al (eds), Aansprake-
lijkheid van bestuurders en commissarissen: Nadere terreinverkenning in een uitdijend rechts-
gebied, Serie vanwege het van der Heijden Instituut, deel 140 (2017) 417–443. 
127 Art 2:210 (5) DCC. 
128 Bulten/Kreileman (fn 126) 417–443. 
129 Asser/Maeijer & Kroeze 2-I* 2015/204, Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 
2009/482 and GH Potjewijd, Vrijwaring voor bestuurders en commissarissen, Ondernemings-
recht 2003/16, 607–613. 
130 HR 20 October 1989, NJ 1990, 308 (Ellem). 
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22. Indemnifying the board and its members from liability vis-à-vis third 
parties in the event of prosecution 
 
It is possible for Corporations to agree upon indemnification in the event that 
Directors are sued by third parties for claims regarding their conduct in their 
capacity as Directors. The extent of indemnification may go as far as both par-
ties wish (damages, judgments, settlements, costs of defence of legal actions, 
claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom) but will not include damage, 
payments or costs that are the result of intent or conscious recklessness nor can 
it impair art 2:9 DCC (acts that qualify as mismanagement for which the Director 
can be severely held to blame). Such an agreement would be in conflict with 
art 3:40 DCC.131 Compensation in a case where the Director is sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment is thus unlikely as such criminal acts are likely to be a form of 
mismanagement. However, the Corporation may pay the legal defence costs of a 
Director, but these have to be paid back (with interest) when the Court has 
judged that the acts of the Director qualify as mismanagement.132 
There is no specific law that deals with indemnification. The indemnification 
may be included in the articles of association, which will be applicable to all Direc-
tors. The General Meeting is authorized to make amendments to the articles of as-
sociation. In addition, it is possible to enter into an indemnification agreement. 
When indemnification is seen as an element of remuneration, the organ that is re-
sponsible for the determination of the Directors’ remuneration would also be re-
sponsible for the decision-making regarding the indemnification. This will be the 
General Meeting, unless the articles of association vest this authority in another 
organ such as the Supervisory Board (arts 2:135(4)/245(1) DCC). The assessment of 
whether a Director may rely on the indemnification has to be executed by the Cor-
poration. A Director with a personal interest cannot take part in the decision-
making (arts 2:129(6)/239(6) DCC) as a direct personal conflict of interests exists. 
Other Directors will have an indirect personal conflict of interest.133 In this way it is 
ensured that Directors cannot indemnify themselves. As no board resolution can 
be passed, the Supervisory Board shall pass the resolution. In the absence of a Su-
pervisory Board, the General Meeting shall pass the resolution, unless the articles 
of association provide otherwise (see for conflict of interest rule the answer to case  
study 20.3).   _____ 
131 Eg Court of Amsterdam 30 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:6932. 
132 GH Potjewijd/M van Olffen/A van Breda, Exoneratie en vrijwaring voor bestuurders en 
commissarissen van vennootschappen, in: G van Solinge et al (eds), Aansprakelijkheid van be-
stuurders en commissarissen: Nadere terreinverkenning in een uitdijend rechtsgebied, Serie 
vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut deel 140 (2017) 445–458. 
133 Potjewijd/van Olffen/van Breda (fn 132) 445–458. 
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22.1. Case Study (limits of indemnity provisions) 
 
(a) The answer to this question depends on whether D, while driving home, is 
considered to still be in his capacity as Director. Opinions on this matter are di-
vided.134 
(b) Falsifications of the company’s balance sheets constitute misman-
agement. See the answer to question 22.  
(c) The acts performed by D (false statements about a competitor) are 
likely to have been made in the function of Director. See the answer to question 
22 for a general explanation about indemnification. The question of whether  
C-Corporation is obligated to make payments by way of damages, judgments, 
and settlements, as well as costs of defence of legal actions, claims or proceed-
ings and appeals therefrom depend on the question of whether the acts of D 
constitute mismanagement under art 2:9 DCC. See for an answer to that ques-
tion our explanation in relation to question 5. If it can be qualified as misman-
agement, C-Corporation is not obligated to indemnify the Director.  
(d) The act of sexual harassment does not fall within the scope of his func-
tion as Director. If D’s agreement with C-Corporation included a provision bring-
ing such acts within the scope of his function (and reimburse him for liabilities 
arising from it), that provision would be in breach of morality and public order 
and therefore be void pursuant to art 3:40 DCC. D was not acting in his capacity 
as a Director when he sexually harassed a co-worker, therefore the claim (based 
on art 6:162 DCC) can be asserted against him directly. Neither does C-Cor-
poration have to reimburse D for the costs incurred to defend himself. 
 
 
III. Liability for Damage to Third Parties 
 
23. Board’s liability towards third parties 
 
Director liability for damage caused to third parties is generally referred to as 
external liability. External liability can, in general, be established in various 
ways: (i) secondary liability: direct (and double) liability, (ii) liability in the case 
of bankruptcy of the Corporation, and (iii) liability prior to and at the moment of 
 _____ 
134 Asser/Maeijer & Kroeze 2-I*/97. L Timmerman, Beginselen van bestuurdersaansprakelijk-
heid. Hoedanigheid van bestuurder doet ertoe, in: G van Solinge et al (eds), Aansprakelijkheid 
van bestuurders en commissarissen: Nadere terreinverkenning in een uitdijend rechtsgebied, 
Serie vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut deel 140 (2017) 25–40. 
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the incorporation of the Corporation. External liability can also be based on 
specific provisions in Dutch company law. We will refer to and discuss these 
provisions when answering the case studies in this section. 
Secondary liability of a Director on the basis of tort (art 6:162 DCC) can ex-
ist when the Corporation is liable on the basis of non-fulfilment of contractual 
or statutory obligations or tort (art 6:162 DCC) for damage caused to a third 
party and the Director can also, due to his conduct as and in his capacity as Di-
rector, be held liable. To protect Directors from potential claims, the legislator 
has set a high threshold that must be met if a Director is to be found liable for 
his management in his capacity as Director. This is the threshold of severe per-
sonal blameworthiness. Rather than applying the regular conditions of 
art 6:162 DCC (discussed below), the standard or threshold of art 6:162 DCC is 
determined by art 2:9 DCC. Extensive case law has interpreted the application of 
art 6:162 DCC in conjunction with art 2:9 DCC and is discussed below. This 
higher degree of protection enjoyed by Directors has been acknowledged as jus-
tified by the Dutch Supreme Court135 because otherwise, out of fear of liability, 
Directors may become more defensive in their decision-making and not take the 
entrepreneurial risk that drives the economy. 
The Ontvanger/Roelofsen case136 is fundamental in asserting whether a Direc-
tor can be severely held to blame. The Supreme Court has adopted stringent 
conditions. In the situation that a Director, acting in his capacity as Director of the 
Corporation, has (i) acted on behalf of the Corporation or (ii) has achieved or al-
lowed that the Corporation can no longer meet its contractual and statutory obli-
gations, severe blameworthiness is established when: (i) the Director, when con-
cluding the obligation, knew or should reasonably have known that the 
Corporation could not meet that obligation and did not have sufficient means to 
remedy the damage of the third party deriving from the Corporation’s default on 
that obligation137 or (ii) the Director knew or reasonably should have known that 
his management had the consequence that existing obligations could no longer 
be met by the Corporation and the Corporation did not have sufficient means to 
remedy the damage of the third party deriving from the Corporation’s default on 
that obligation. It depends on the circumstances whether the blameworthiness is 
sufficiently severe to hold him personally liable (on the basis that his conduct 
lacks carefulness to such an extent that he can be personally severely blamed).138 
 _____ 
135 HR 20 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC4959 (Willemsen/NOM) and HR 5 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2628 (Hezemans Air/Van der Meer). 
136 HR 8 December 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AZ0758 (Ontvanger/Roelofsen). 
137 HR 6 October 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AB9521 (Beklamel). 
138 HR 13 August 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA4873 (New Holland Belgium/Oosterhof). 
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In the Spaanse Villa case139 the Director’s duty of care was defined by the 
way he presented himself to the third party, as a real estate expert, and not in 
his capacity as Director. This conduct of the Director, that caused damage to 
third parties, is then not attributed to him in his capacity as Director but attrib-
uted to him in his own, personal capacity. Despite the fact that the liability in 
this case concerns the conduct of the Director in his own, personal capacity, if 
that conduct could also be considered as conduct on behalf of the Corporation 
or attributed to the Corporation, the Corporation could also be held liable (dou-
ble liability). Whether conduct is considered to be on behalf of or attributable to 
a Corporation depends on the circumstances of the case at hand and generally 
accepted practices.140  
The direct liability, as established in the Spaanse Villa case, stirred quite 
some debate in the Netherlands as it seemed that the high degree of protection 
enjoyed by Directors – the threshold of severe personal blameworthiness – 
could suddenly be circumvented (under certain circumstances as mentioned 
above). This contradicts the notion that third parties enter into contracts with 
the Corporation, a legal form with its own legal personality, rather than its rep-
resentative (the Director) because, under certain circumstances, the Director 
would be considered to be acting on his own behalf. In the Tulip Air case,141 the 
Supreme Court explicitly gives a further explanation of its conclusions from the 
Spaanse Villa case and emphasizes that the possibility of direct liability only 
arises if the Director acts in his capacity as a private person, on his own be-
half instead of in his capacity as Director of the Corporation. Consequently, 
not the standard of severe personal blameworthiness (determined by art 2:9 
DCC) but the regular standard for liability has to be met (tort, art 6:162 DCC).142 
In the relationship between the Director and the third party, the Director has a 
personal duty of care towards that third party, which is determined depend-
ing on the situation. This is a different standard or duty of care than the stan-
dard or duty of care in his capacity as Director of a Corporation (art 2:9 DCC). If a 
Corporation is held liable pursuant to any form of civil liability and its Director 
is also sued, a claimant must still prove severe blameworthiness on the part of 
the Director. 
Liability for misleading information about the financial condition of 
the Corporation: If the financial condition of the Corporation has been misrep-
resented in the annual accounts or in the interim figures as published by the 
 _____ 
139 HR 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX5881 (Spaanse Villa). 
140 HR 6 April 1979, ECLI:NL:HR:1979:AH8595 (Kleuterschool Babbel). 
141 HR 5 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2628 (Tulip Air). 
142 See also HR 18 September 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2745. 
116 
117 
118 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in the Netherlands | 349 
 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
Corporation or in the annual report, then the Directors are jointly and sever-
ally liable towards third persons for the damage which they have suffered as a 
result thereof. A Director who proves that such misrepresentation is not attrib-
utable to him is not liable (arts 2:139/249 DCC). 
Liability in the case of bankruptcy of the Corporation: External liability 
of Directors in the case of bankruptcy is described in arts 2:138/248 DCC. This is 
a form of secondary liability. Primarily the insolvent Corporation is liable to-
wards its creditors for all outstanding debts. Claims against Directors of a bank-
rupt Corporation on the basis of arts 2:138/248 DCC can only be made by the liq-
uidator. The liquidator represents all creditors of the Corporation. In order for 
his claim to be successful, the liquidator must prove that the Board of Directors 
(or any individual Director, as the liability is joint and several) has performed its 
duties manifestly improperly (manifestly improper management) and that it 
is probable that this manifestly improper management was an important cause 
of the Corporationʼs bankruptcy (arts 2:138(1)/248(1) DCC). As decided in the 
Panmo case, manifestly improper entails that ‘no reasonable (Board of) Direc-
tor(s) would have acted in the same way under similar circumstances’.143 As  
is the case with internal liability (art 2:9 DCC), individual Directors can excul-
pate themselves from liability by showing that they cannot be blamed for the  
manifestly improper management and that they were not negligent in taking  
measures to avoid the negative consequences of manifestly improper manage-
ment (arts 2:138(3)/248(3) DCC). Articles 2:138(2)/248(2) DCC provide the liqui- 
dator with a presumption. If the Board of Directors has not met its obligations 
under art 2:10 DCC (accountancy) and art 2:394 DCC (publication of annual 
report), then manifestly improper management is automatically established 
and it is assumed this was an important cause of the Corporation’s bankruptcy. 
This assumption cannot be refuted.144 An insignificant omission (default) is, 
however, not taken into account. Liability pursuant to arts 2:138/248 DCC is 
then established and the Board of Directors can only escape this outcome if it 
proves that the bankruptcy was caused by external factors or circumstances.145  
A legal action (claim) against one or more Directors can be filed only on the ba-
sis of arts 2:138/248 DCC on the ground of manifestly improper management, 
which took place in the period of three years preceding the Corporationʼs 
bankruptcy. The fact that a Director has been discharged from liability does not 
preclude the filing of a legal action (claim) as meant in the previous sentence.  
 _____ 
143 HR 26 July 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB2053 (Panmo). Also: HR 12 February 2016, ECLI:NL: 
HR:2016:233. 
144 Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/459. 
145 See HR 12 February 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:233. 
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A person, who has actually determined or co-determined the policy of the Cor-
poration, as if he were a Director, is for liability reasons equally treated as a Di-
rector. Articles 2:138/248 DCC do not affect the possibilities of the liquidator in 
the bankruptcy of the Corporation to file a legal action (claim) against a Director 
on the basis of the agreement between the Corporation and the Director, on the 
basis of art 2:9 DCC or on the basis of art 6:162 DCC on behalf of the creditors.146 
Liability for tax debts, social insurance contributions and contribu-
tions to company pension funds: Directors may be held liable for tax debts, 
social insurance contributions and contributions to company pension funds in 
two ways. First, an action based on general tort law, as described before. Sec-
ond, and more common, an action based on art 36 Tax Collection Act (Invor-
deringswet, TCA). Article 36 TCA stipulates the liability of Directors of a Corpora-
tion with regard to certain tax debts such as wage withholding tax, VAT, and 
customs duties and also to unpaid tax debts incurred by other Corporations for 
which the Corporation was held liable. The same applies to social security pre-
miums and compulsory contributions to the company pension fund (art 60 So-
cial Security Finance Act (Wet financiering sociale verzekeringen) and art 23 Sec-
toral Pension Fund Obligatory Participation Act (Wet verplichte deelneming in 
een bedrijfstakpensioenfonds 2000)), hereinafter referred to as ‘Taxes’. The li-
ability under these provisions includes the liability of the former Director during 
whose term of management the due taxes occur and the liability of a legal en- 
tity as a Director of the Corporation. A person, who has actually determined or 
co-determined the policy of the Corporation as if he were a Director, is for liabil-
ity reasons equally treated as a Director. The Corporation, and therefore its Di-
rectors, is obliged to inform the competent authorities immediately with a writ-
ten notification in the event it is unable to pay Taxes; this is hereinafter referred 
to as ‘Notification Duty’. If the Corporation does not fulfil, or improperly fulfils, 
its Notification Duty, each Director of the Corporation is jointly and severally as-
sumed liable for the payment of the due Taxes. This liability is already estab-
lished if the Corporation fails to discharge its Notification Duty and not (only) if 
the Corporation is actually failing in the payment of the due Taxes. A Director 
can exculpate himself only by showing that it was not his fault that the Corpora-
tion did not comply with the Notification Duty or if he can prove that it was not 
due to manifestly improper management on his part that the taxes were not 
paid. In most cases this exculpation is near to impossible. Case law provides 
many cases in which Directors are held liable due to non-fulfilment of the Noti-
fication Duty. However, if the Corporation fulfils its Notification Duty, a Director  _____ 
146 HR 14 January 1983, ECLI:NL:HR:1983:AG4521(Peeters/Gatzen) and HR 16 September 
2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT7797 (De Bont/Bannenberg). 
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can only be held liable if the relevant authorities prove that the Taxes were not 
paid because of manifestly improper management on the part of the Director in 
the period of three years preceding the time of the notification. This is a heavy 
burden of proof. In most cases it concerns fraud, failing to properly keep the 
Corporation’s accounts and records or failing to file proper tax returns. If the 
relevant authorities, in most cases the tax authorities, succeed in this burden of 
proof, an individual director can try to exculpate himself. He must prove that he 
is not to blame for the improper management. Improper management is defined 
in case law as if no reasonable director would have acted in the manner con-
cerned in similar circumstances.147 Such exculpation is difficult, but not impos-
sible. 
Special rules provide for liability prior to and at the moment of the in-
corporation of the company. Directors have the obligation to register the NV 
or BV in the Commercial Register and must deposit at the office of that register 
(Chamber of Commerce) an authentic extract of the notarial deed of incorpora-
tion and of the documents attached to it pursuant to art 2:204 DCC. The Direc-
tors are each, in addition to the BV, jointly and severally liable for any juridical 
act performed during their directorship through which the Corporation has been 
committed (bound) in the period prior to the moment at which the application 
for the initial registration in the Commercial Register was lodged, together with 
the extracts and copies to be deposited (art 2:180 DCC). 
Directors are responsible for the registration of the NV in the Commercial 
Register, and must deposit at the office of that register (Chamber of Commerce) 
an authentic extract of the notarial deed of incorporation and of the documents 
attached to it pursuant to arts 2:93a, 2:94 and 2:94a DCC as well as a copy of the 
documents compiled pursuant to art 2:94a (4), last sentence DCC. They must, at 
the same time, report to the keeper of the Commercial Register for registration 
the total of the real and estimated costs incurred or to be incurred for account of 
the Corporation in connection with its formation (incorporation). The Directors 
are jointly and severally liable, in addition to the NV, for any juridical act per-
formed during their directorship through which the Corporation has been com-
mitted (bound) in a period prior to the moment at which: (a) the application for 
the initial registration in the Commercial Register was lodged, together with the 
extracts and copies to be deposited; (b) the paid up share capital amounts to at 
least the minimum capital required for the formation (incorporation) of an NV, 
and; (c) at least one-quarter of the nominal value of the share capital issued at 
the formation (incorporation) has been paid up (art 2:69 DCC).  _____ 
147 HR 7 June 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZC2096 (Van Zoolingen) and HR 8 June 2001, ECLI:NL: 
HR:2001:AB2053 (Panmo). 
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The persons who have performed a juridical act in the name of a yet to be 
incorporated BV are jointly and severally liable for that act until the Corpora-
tion has ratified it after its incorporation, unless the contrary has been stipu-
lated explicitly in respect of that juridical act. If the Corporation has ratified the 
juridical act but fails to perform the obligations which arise from it, then the 
persons who have acted in the name of the yet to be incorporated BV are jointly 
and severally liable for the damage which a third person suffers as a result if 
they knew or reasonably could have known that the Corporation could not meet 
these obligations, all without prejudice to any possible liability of the Directors 
on account of a ratification. The knowledge that the Corporation could not meet 
its obligations is presumed when the Corporation is declared bankrupt within 
one year after its incorporation (art 2:203(2)(3) DCC).148 
The same rules apply to the NV (art 2:93 DCC). 
Article 6:162 DCC defines what, under Dutch civil law, is considered a tor-
tious act and under what circumstances a (legal or natural) person is liable for 
damages to a third party. The following conditions must all be met for a claim 
based on tort to be successful. These conditions will be presumed to have been 
met in answering the case studies, unless stated otherwise. A tortious act is, 
save for justification, (i) a violation of someone else’s right; or, (ii) an act or 
omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to unwrit-
ten law has to be regarded as proper social conduct (art 6:162(2) DCC). This act 
must have caused (causality) damage (no claim without damage) to a third 
party. Furthermore, the tortious act must be attributable to a person (art 6:162(1) 
DCC). A tortious act can be attributed to a person committing the tortious act if it 
results from his fault or from a cause for which he is accountable by virtue of 
law or generally accepted principles (art 6:162(3) DCC). Finally, there is no obli-
gation to repair the damage on the ground of a tortious act if the violated stan-
dard of behavior is not intended to offer protection against damage as suffered 
by the injured person (art 6:163 DCC). If these conditions are met, a person is li-
able and must repair the damage suffered by the third party.  
 
 
23.1. Case Study (board’s instruction to provide inappropriate advice by sales 
representatives) 
 
Unfortunately for P, C-Corporation has become insolvent and most likely will  
not be able to remedy the damage P suffered. Assuming C-Corporation is liable  _____ 
148 HR 28 March 1997, NJ 1997, 582. See also: Court of Appeal Amsterdam 9 February 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:424. 
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towards P due to its default under the purchase agreement, this fulfils the prereq-
uisite for secondary liability of D. P can now also assert its claim against D. As 
discussed in detail in the answer to question 23, the threshold of severe blame-
worthiness must be met if a Director is to be found liable for damages towards P. 
P must show that D, when concluding obligations on behalf of C-Corporation (or 
in this case instructing his employees to enter into agreements on behalf of  
C-Corporations with, for example, P), knew or should have reasonably known 
that C-Corporation could not meet its obligation under the agreement with P and 
C-Corporation did not have sufficient means to remedy the damage sustained by 
the third party deriving from the Corporation’s default on that obligation. 
C-Corporation’s obligation due to its liability under the purchase agreement 
would be to reimburse P for the worthless product and to compensate P for the 
physical injury. It is likely that at the time of conclusion of the purchase agree-
ment between C-Corporation and P, D knew or reasonably should have known 
that C-Corporation could not meet its obligations under the purchase agree-
ment, given the fact that D instructs the employees to provide inappropriate in-
formation to possible purchasers, if necessary, and to give incomplete advice in 
order to sell as many products as possible. It is unclear whether D knew or rea-
sonably should have known that C-Corporation did not have sufficient means to 
remedy the damage sustained by the third party deriving from the Corporation’s 
default on that obligation. 
If D participated directly in the sales, this would not change the legal as-
sessment. D was still acting in his capacity as Director of C-Corporation. 
 
 
23.2. Case Study (presenting false annual statements to third parties) 
 
If the financial condition of the Corporation has been misrepresented in the 
annual accounts or in the interim figures as published by the Corporation or in 
the annual report, then the Directors are jointly and severally liable towards 
third parties for the damage which they have suffered as a result thereof. A Di-
rector who proves that such misrepresentation is not attributable to him is not 
liable (arts 2:139/249 DCC).  
Regardless of any proceedings initiated by the liquidator (arts 2:138/248 
DCC), P can assert its own claim against D or, alternatively, D1 and D2. For the 
outcome of the case it is irrelevant whether D negligently or intentionally pre-
sented false balance sheets and/or D1 persuaded D2 to present P with false bal-
ance sheets. 
Unlike other forms of civil liability of Directors in their capacity as Director 
of a Corporation, no severe blameworthiness is required when applying 
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arts 2:139/249 DCC.149 Liability is established if it is concluded that the financial 
condition of a Corporation has been misrepresented (and third parties that re-
lied on that information suffered damage as a result thereof). 
Misrepresentation of the financial condition of a Corporation entails that 
the quality and/or content does not meet the standards as accepted in general 
legal practice as found in art 2:362 DCC.150 Though a claim on the basis of in-
terim figures is possible, the (im)precision of such figures must be considered.151 
Articles 2:139/249 DCC can be seen as a lex specialis of tort (art 6:162 DCC), save 
for the fact that the provision already presumes that the misrepresentation is at-
tributable to the Director(s) (though rebuttable, arts 2:139/249 (second sentence) 
DCC). The claimant must demonstrate that there is a causal link between the 
misrepresentation of the financial condition of the Corporation and his dam-
age.152 In that case, liability of the Director(s) may be established. 
 
 
23.3. Case Study (publishing an incorrect prospectus) 
 
Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive153 stipulates that the issuer, offeror or per-
son asking for the admission to trade on a regulated market or guarantor is re-
sponsible for the information given in a prospectus. However, civil liability can-
not be based directly on this provision or on the Dutch Act on Financial 
Supervision.154 Under Dutch civil law, no specific prospectus liability regime 
exists. Prospectus liability claims can be based on the general tort law provi-
sion of section 6:162 DCC ff. For a claim based on torts for an incorrect prospec-
tus, two species of tort law are relevant. First, investors that qualify as consum-
ers are protected by arts 6:193a-193j DCC in which the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive155 has been implemented. Second, investors that do not 
 _____ 
149 ML Lennarts, T&C Burgerlijk Wetboek, commentaar op artikel 139 Boek 2 BW. 
150 Huizink (fn 41) art 139 Boek 2 BW, aant 3. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Asser/Maeijer & Kroeze 2-I* 2015/573. 
153 Directive 2010/73/EU opf the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transpar-
ency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market. 
154 Wet van 28 September 2006, houdende regels met betrekking tot de financiële markten en 
het toezicht daarop (Wet op het financieel toezicht). 
155 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 con-
cerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amend- 
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qualify as consumers are protected by the rules on misleading advertise-
ments. The Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive156 has been im-
plemented in arts 6:194–196 DCC.  
A trader acts tortiously towards a consumer if he engages in a commercial 
practice that is unfair. A trader is any natural person or legal entity who, in 
commercial practices covered by arts 6:193a–j DCC, acts in the course of his pro-
fessional practice or business and anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of 
such a trader. A consumer is a natural person who, in commercial practices 
covered by arts 6:193a–j DCC, does not act in the course of his professional prac-
tice or business. A commercial practice is any act, omission, course of conduct 
or representation, commercial communication, including advertising and mar-
keting, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a 
product to consumers. A commercial practice is unfair if a trader acts: (a) con-
trary to the requirements of professional diligence, and (b) the ability of the av-
erage consumer to make a decision on the basis of sufficient information is no-
ticeably limited or may be noticeably limited, because of which the average 
consumer made or may have made a transactional decision which he otherwise 
would not have made (art 6:193b(2) DCC). In particular, commercial practices 
shall be unfair if a trader conducts: (a) a misleading commercial practice as 
meant in arts 6:193c up to and including 6:193g DCC, or (b) an aggressive com-
mercial practice as meant in arts 6:193h and 6:193i DCC.  
The person that makes public or causes to be made public misleading in-
formation regarding goods or services which he, or the person for whom he acts, 
offers in the conduct of a profession or a business can be held liable. For exam-
ple, (i) publication of a misleading prospectus (this is for instance the case when 
certain important information is omitted); (ii) carrying out an unfair commercial 
practice; or (iii) publication of misleading advertisements.  
Is D liable to P?157 In the case study, an incorrect prospectus has been pub-
lished and D has provided false information to the auditor who used this infor-
mation for drafting the prospectus. As the act of providing incorrect information 
is an ‘internal’ act, D will not be qualified as a direct perpetrator under 
arts 6:193a–193j DCC and 6:194–196 DCC. It is more likely that D is liable to P on  _____ 
ing Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), in effect since 15 October 
2008. 
156 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising, in effect since 15 October 2008. 
157 JP Franx, (Prospectus)aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders bij beursgang en emissie, in het 
bijzonder onder de Wet oneerlijke handelspraktijken, Ondernemingsrecht 2014/112, 571–579. 
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the basis of general tort (art 6:162 DCC) as a secondary perpetrator because the 
Corporation has published an incorrect prospectus, which qualifies as a mis-
leading commercial practice and therefore results in a tortious act of the Corpo-
ration vis-à-vis the investors. D will then be jointly liable if he can be severely 
held to blame. In this case D negligently and intentionally provided incorrect in-
formation. As he therefore knew that the Corporation would act tortiously when 
providing this information to investors, it is most likely that D can be severely 
held to blame and will be liable towards P for the misleading or incorrect pro-
spectus. We refer to the general outline of tort (art 6:162 DCC) under question 23 
for further requirements. 
 
 
23.4. Case Study (violation of cartel law) 
 
Agreements, such as illegal price-fixing, that violate the cartel prohibitions of 
art 6(1) Competition Act or art 101(1) TFEU, are null and void on the basis of 
art 6(2) Competition Act or art 101(2) TFEU. Furthermore, art 3:40(2) DCC de-
clares void legal acts contrary to mandatory rules. A claim for damages in the 
case of infringement of antitrust rules can be based on tort (art 6:162 DCC). D as 
Director of C-Corporation is jointly liable as a secondary perpetrator if he can 
be severely held to blame. In this case D participates in illegal price-fixing. It is 
likely that D is liable towards P for violation of cartel law. However, as far as we 
know no case law has been published on this issue. We refer to the general out-
line of tort (art 6:162 DCC) under question 23 for further requirements.158 
 
 
23.5. Case Study (infringement of competition law) 
 
If P is a competitor of C-Corporation and therefore is to be considered as acting 
in the course of a business, his claim can be based on the ground of compara-
tive misleading advertisement, as a specific rule of tort law. Article 6:194a 
DCC defines comparative advertising as any advertising, which explicitly or by 
implication identifies a competitor or goods or services offered by a competitor. 
Comparative advertising shall, as far as the comparison is concerned, be permit-
ted when the following conditions are met: (a) it is not misleading; (b) it com- 
  _____ 
158 BJ Drijber, Mededingingsrecht, in: BF Assink et al (eds), De vele gezichten van Maarten 
Kroeze’s ‘Bange Bestuurders’, Uitgave vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht deel 104 
(2017) 125–136. 
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pares goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same pur-
pose; (c) it objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and 
representative feature of those goods and services, which may include price; (d) 
it does not create confusion in the market place between the advertiser and a 
competitor or between the advertiser’s trademarks, trade names, other distin-
guishing marks, goods or services and those of a competitor; (e) it does not dis-
credit or denigrate the trademarks, trade names, other distinguishing marks, 
goods, services, activities, or circumstances of a competitor; (f) for products 
with designation of origin, it relates in each case to products with the same des-
ignation; (g) it does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, 
trade name or other distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation 
of origin of competing products; and (h) it does not present goods or services as 
imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a protected trade mark or 
trade name. 
Under art 6:194 DCC, a person who makes public or allows to be made pub-
lic an announcement regarding goods or services which he, or the person on 
whose behalf he acts, presents in the course of a professional practice or busi-
ness, acts tortiously towards another person who acts in the course of his bu-
siness if this announcement is misleading in one or more of the following  
respects, for example as to: (a) the nature, composition, quantity, quality, char-
acteristics or possibilities for use; (b) the origin, the way and the time of manu-
facturing; (c) the size or volume of the goods in stock; (d) the price or its method 
of calculation; (e) the grounds for or the purpose of the offer; (f) the awarded 
distinctions, certificates (references) or other assessments or declarations of 
third persons, or the used scientific or technical terms, the technical findings or 
the statistical data; (g) the conditions under which goods are supplied, services 
are rendered or payment is made; (h) the extent, content or duration of the war-
ranty (guarantee); (i) the identity, qualities, capacity or competence and the 
person by whom, or under whose control or supervision or with whose coopera-
tion, the goods are or will be manufactured or are presented or the services are 
or will be performed. 
If the advertisements qualify as misleading comparative advertisements 
under art 6:194/194a DCC, the Corporation has acted tortiously. D as director of 
C-Corporation is jointly liable as a secondary perpetrator if he can be se-
verely held to blame. It is likely that D is liable towards P for misleading adver-
tisements. We refer to the general outline of tort (art 6:162 DCC) under question 
23 for further requirements.159 
 _____ 
159 Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009, nos 269 and 471. 
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24. Company insolvency: liability of the board and its members towards the 
company’s creditors 
 
As discussed under question 23, individual Directors can be held liable in the 
case of insolvency by liquidators (arts 6:162 and 2:138/248 DCC) or individual 
creditors (art 6:162 DCC). 
 
 
24.1. Case Study (delay in filing for insolvency) 
 
P1, P2 and P3 are individual creditors of C-Corporation and thus each able to in-
dividually assert claims against C-Corporation for not meeting its contractual 
obligations and, in line with such claims, assert claims against D pursuant to 
art 6:162 DCC. For a claim against D to be successful, the threshold of severe 
blameworthiness must be met. We refer to the outline of secondary liability, as 
described under question 23. 
D, acting in his capacity as Director of C-Corporation, has achieved or al-
lowed that C-Corporation can no longer meet its contractual obligations. If D 
knew or reasonably should have known that his management had the conse-
quence that existing obligations could no longer be met and the Corporation 
did not have sufficient means to remedy the damage to the third party de-
riving from the Corporation’s default on those obligations,160 then D is liable 
for the damage to that third party.  
The case study could be pleaded as follows. As of 1 January 2014, shortly af-
ter entering into the loan agreement between C-Corporation and P1, D was in 
possession of such knowledge, yet he did not undertake any action to avoid 
or limit the damage P1 would suffer as a consequence of the direct financial 
situation of C-Corporation. It cannot be derived from the facts of the case what 
the cause of the insolvency was, thus only damage resulting from the difference 
between the 20% recovery rate of 1 January 2014 and the 15% recovery rate of 1 
June 2014 can be confidently attributed to D’s conduct. For that part, D failed to 
appreciate the interests of P1, and P1 would be able to demonstrate severe 
blameworthiness on the part of D, making D liable for P1’s damages.  
In the case of P2 and P3, when entering into the agreements D knew or 
should have reasonably known that C-Corporation could not meet its obliga-
tions under these agreements and did not have sufficient means to remedy the 
damage to P2 and P3 deriving from the Corporation’s default on those agree-
 _____ 
160 HR 13 August 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA4873 (New Holland Belgium/Oosterhof). 
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ments.161 D should never have entered into an agreement with either P2 or 
P3, therefore all damage they suffered can be attributed to D’s conduct. Severe 
blameworthiness can, again, be established. Consequently, D is also liable for 
the damage to P2 (to the amount of the outstanding loan) and P3 (to the amount 
of € 400). 
 
 
25. General duties owed by the board and its members towards creditors and 
liability for breach 
 
As explained in the answer to question 23, (individual) Directors can be se-
condarily liable with their Corporation if they can be severely held to blame 
for their conduct towards the third party (eg a creditor) (art 6:162 DCC).162  
A Director’s liability towards creditors may be established in the case of  
the Corporation’s insolvency (art 2:138/248 DCC). Dutch law and case law do  
not define or limit the type of duties that, if breached, result in Director’s lia-
bility. 
 
 
25.1. Case Study (personal liability for delay in filing financial statements) 
 
Given the insolvency of C-Corporation and the liability for the non-fulfilment of 
its contractual obligations, P can assert a claim pursuant to art 6:162 DCC 
against D. P must prove that D, acting on behalf of C-Corporation, is severely 
blameworthy for the Corporation’s inability to meet its contractual obligations 
towards P. This secondary liability is established if D, when entering into an 
agreement with P on behalf of C-Corporation, knew or reasonably should have 
known that C-Corporation could not meet its obligations under that agree-
ment and did not have sufficient means to remedy the damage to P deriving 
from C-Corporation’s default.163 The burden of proof lies on P. The fact that D 
fails to publish the annual statement of C-Corporation in a timely manner and in 
the required form is one of the circumstances for establishing D’s liability, but 
does not automatically lead to liability as such. 
 
 _____ 
161 HR 6 October 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AB9521 (Beklamel). 
162 HR 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX5881 (Spaanse Villa) and HR 5 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2628 (Tulip). 
163 HR 6 October 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AB9521 (Beklamel) and HR 8 December 2006, ECLI: 
NL:HR:2006:AZ0758 (Ontvanger/Roelofsen). 
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26. Direct liability of the board and its members towards creditors 
 
As explained in the answer to question 23, (individual) Directors can be secon-
darily liable if they can be severely held to blame for their conduct against a 
third party (eg a creditor or a third party) (art 6:162 DCC) if their Corporation is 
liable to that third party. Dutch law does not define or limit the type of duties 
that, if breached, result in Director’s liability. The third party may also encoun-
ter difficulties in establishing causality between the conduct of a Director in his 
capacity as Director of a Corporation and the damage suffered. Even if causality 
is established, depending on the claim made, it remains to be seen whether a 
Director’s duty of care goes as far as having to take into account the inter-
ests of that third party.  
 
 
27. Limiting the liability of the board and its members towards third parties 
 
As discussed in detail in the answer to questions 21 and 22, the Board of Direc-
tors and/or individual Directors cannot limit their liability towards third par-
ties. We refer to Part II, under D (above no 105 ff). 
 
 
27.1. Case Study (limitation of liability)  
 
As discussed in detail in the answer to questions 21 and 22, the Board of Direc-
tors and/or individual Directors cannot limit their liability towards the com-
pany and/or the shareholders, or to third parties. We refer to Part II, under D 
(above no 105 ff). 
 
 
IV. Procedural Law Aspects 
 
28. Persons and corporate organs can be parties to a suit for damages 
 
In the Netherlands only individual Directors (as defendants), individual Super- 
visory Directors (as defendants), individual shareholders (as plaintiffs), Direc-
tors de facto (as defendants) – anyone who has played a part in the Corpora-
tion’s management as if he were a director, arts 2:138(7)/248(7) DCC and 
arts 2:151/261 DCC – and, of course, the Corporation itself (as plaintiff) – thus 
not Corporate Bodies – can be party to a lawsuit for damages due to the mis-
148 
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conduct of the Board of Directors or the Supervisory Board. If, for example, the 
Board of Directors consists of several Directors and the Corporation would like 
to claim damages due to misconduct of the Board of Directors, the Corporation 
must file the lawsuit against all individual Directors. 
We interpreted this question as to whether Corporate Bodies or individual 
members of those bodies can be party to a lawsuit. In answering this question we 
opted for the case that the Corporation as plaintiff files a lawsuit against Directors 
as defendants due to misconduct. It should be noted that, for example, Directors 
could file lawsuits against each other to indemnify and hold harmless for wrongful 
acts of another Director. In practice many variations in these lawsuits are possible. 
 
 
29. Standing and requirements to sue for damages against the board 
 
Dutch law distinguishes between decision-making and the power to represent 
the Corporation. If the decision to file a lawsuit for damages against the Board of 
Directors and/or one or more of the Directors is on the agenda of a Board of Di-
rectorsʼ meeting, it is likely that all present Directors have a conflict of interest. 
Articles 2:129(6)/239(6) DCC stipulate that a Director does not participate in the 
deliberations and decision-making if he has a direct or indirect personal interest 
therein that is contrary to the interests of the Corporation and the affiliated en-
terprises. The same applies for Supervisory Directors (arts 2:140(5)/250(5) DCC). 
If, as a result, no resolution can be passed, the resolution has to be passed by 
the General Meeting, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.  
If the requirements of the decision-making as described are not met, this does 
not affect the power to represent the Corporation. This power remains with the 
Board of Directors. It is not likely that present Directors will file a lawsuit against 
themselves. Therefore it is advisable to remove the present Directors and to appoint 
one or more new members of the Board of Directors. Another solution would be that 
the General Meeting appoints a special representative to represent the Corporation 
in the lawsuit against its (present) Directors. In general, the attorney filing the  
lawsuit on behalf of the Corporation will (or should) check whether these require-
ments are met and whether the Corporation is duly represented in this lawsuit. 
 
 
30. Legal representatives and conflicts of interests 
 
It is possible for a lawyer who represented the Corporation and worked closely with 
its Board of Directors to represent the Corporation in a suit for damages against 
former Directors, since the lawyer represented the Corporation and not the (indi-
152 
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vidual) Director. However, due to the (close) relationship between the former Di-
rector and the lawyer, it is not likely that this will happen. In practice, another law-
yer will be appointed by the Corporation to represent the Corporation in the lawsuit 
against its former Director. If a lawyer represented the Corporation in the past, he 
cannot represent the Directors or an individual (former) Director in the lawsuit 
against the Corporation. The rules of the Dutch Bar Association do not allow this. 
 
 
31. Pursuing damages against the board and its members: procedural rules 
and competent court 
 
There is no special proceeding for claims for damages against boards and/or 
their members. The general action (dagvaardingsprocedure) is applicable, which 
means, in principle, that the court of first instance (Rechtbank) of the defen-
dant’s residence is the competent court in these legal disputes.164  
The Enterprise Court (Ondernemingskamer), a specific judicial organ within 
the Court of Amsterdam, endowed with competences in specific areas of corpo-
rate law, deviates from regular proceedings and deals with inquiry proceed-
ings. As art 2:350 DCC states, the inquiry shall be allowed if there is a reason-
able cause to doubt proper management. If this is the case, the Enterprise Court 
appoints one or more persons who will inquire into the possible mismanage-
ment. If the(se) inquirer(s) conclude(s) that mismanagement has taken place, 
the original initiators of the inquiry proceedings or Advocate-General on the ba-
sis of general interest may request the Enterprise Court to apply one or more of 
the remedies mentioned in art 2:356 DCC, including but not limited to: the sus-
pension or discharge of Directors, the annulment of their decisions and 
dissolution of the legal entity. The inquiry proceedings cannot be limited in 
any way by the company’s articles of association or an agreement.165 
 
 
V. Insurance Law Aspects 
 
32. General statutory and non-statutory rules regulating D&O insurance 
 
In the Netherlands D&O insurance policies are mostly connected to Directors, 
Supervisory Directors and shadow/de facto Directors. In this part we will dis-
 _____ 
164 Art 99 LCP. 
165 Veenstra (fn 56) art 2:345 BW, aant A. 
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cuss D&O insurances in this respect. There are no general rules stipulating that 
Directors, Supervisory Directors and/or the Corporation are obliged to take out a 
D&O insurance policy, nor is D&O insurance regulated in the DCGC. However, 
risk management is part of the DCGC 2016. Risk management of large multina-
tional (listed) Corporations includes D&O coverage. D&O coverage is also in-
creasingly on the agenda of small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’). Deductibles 
are becoming more common practice, allowing insurers to adjust their policies 
to individual Directors, Officers and Corporations. If a Director or Supervisory 
Director would like to take out extra insurance also covering the deductible, 
this will, in general, lead to a higher premium. It depends on the remuneration 
arrangement between the Director or Supervisory Director on the one hand and 
the Corporation on the other hand, who pays for that extra premium. 
 
 
33. D&O policies: parties, corporate representatives and the treatment of 
premiums 
 
Usually, the Corporation – as insurance policyholder – is party to the insurance 
agreement with the insurer. The Corporation – as insurance policyholder – is 
obliged to pay the insurance premiums relating to the D&O insurance. The costs 
of D&O insurances are borne by the Corporation. A D&O insurance policy – a Side 
A cover: covering the personal liability of Directors and Supervisory Directors as 
individuals – is part of the remuneration of Directors and Supervisory Directors 
of larger multinational (listed) Corporations, and – increasingly – also part of the 
remuneration of Directors and Supervisory Directors of SMEs. 
Usually, a D&O insurance policy has a Side A cover, ie covering the personal 
liability of the D&O themselves, and a Side B cover or Corporation reimbursement 
cover, ie covering the reimbursement of the insured Corporation if it paid out the 
claim of a third party on behalf of its Director(s) and/or Supervisory Director(s). 
Listed Corporations can also obtain a Side C cover or securities entity cover, ie a 
cover for claims against the Corporation itself for a wrongful act in connection with 
the trading of its securities. The Side C cover has the effect that in the case of a 
claim against both the D&Os and the Corporation, the coverage under the insur-
ance has to be shared by the D&Os and the Corporation. As a result, Corporations 
take on extra layers of insurance with regard to the Side A cover, which is called the 
A side only insurance. This insurance is activated when the maximum coverage 
under the ‘normal’ insurance has been paid.166 See also the answer to question 37.  _____ 
166 H Londonck Sluijk, Dekking onder D&O verzekeringen, in: G van Solinge et al (eds),  
Aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders en commissarissen: Nadere terreinverkenning in een   
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Dutch law distinguishes between decision-making and the power to repre-
sent the Corporation. If the decision to enter into a D&O insurance is on the 
agenda of the Corporation, it is likely that all Directors and Supervisory Di-
rectors have a conflict of interest, since a Side A cover is usually obtained for  
all Directors. Articles 2:129(6)/239(6) DCC stipulate that a Director shall not par-
ticipate in the deliberations and decision-making if he has a direct or in- 
direct personal interest therein that is contrary to the interests of the Corpora-
tion and its affiliated enterprises. The same applies to Supervisory Directors 
(arts 2:140(5)/250(5) DCC). If, as a result, no resolution can be passed, the reso-
lution has to be passed by the General Meeting, unless the articles of association 
provide otherwise. However, the power to represent the Corporation remains 
with the Board of Directors or other persons who have been authorized to repre-
sent the Corporation. Nowadays, it is common that one of the Directors repre-
sents the Corporation in relation to the insurance, whereas this used to be an in-
house counsel, the secretary of the Board of Directors or the Risk and Insurance 
manager.167 
 
 
34. Insured persons 
 
The Directors, Supervisory Directors or shadow Directors (feitelijk beleidsbepal-
ers) who fall within the scope of the definition of D&O under the insurance 
agreement qualify as insured persons. Mostly, this means that statutory Direc-
tors qualify as insured persons as well as persons that have been involved in le-
gal proceedings in which they have been alleged to be a shadow/de facto Direc-
tor taking into account the judgement of the Court. This means that, if the claim 
is based on liability as a shadow Director, and the Court decides that the defen-
dant is liable but not as a shadow/de facto Director, the costs of the defence will 
be covered but the damages to be paid by the defendant will not.168 Usually, all 
current, future and past Directors and Supervisory Directors of a Corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries are covered under a D&O policy. The insured persons 
are generally natural persons. When a Director is a legal entity, this means that 
in legal proceedings in which both the legal entity as well as the natural person 
 _____ 
uitdijend rechtsgebied, Serie vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut deel 140 (2017)  
459–471. 
167 Londonck Sluijk (fn 166) 459–471. 
168 A Hendrikse, De (niet statutair)bestuurder-werknemer en de bestuurdersaansprakelijk-
heidsverzekering, in: Y Borrius et al (eds), Geschriften vanwege de Vereniging Corporate Litiga-
tion 2016-2017, Serie vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut deel 141 (2017) 325–336. 
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who is the indirect Director are defendants, the costs relating to the defence of 
the legal entity are not insured. The Side A cover insures the Directors and Su-
pervisory Directors (or the larger group of persons, as mentioned above). It is 
thus possible to take out a group insurance. The Side B cover insures the Cor-
poration. It is also possible to include members of the Executive Committee and 
senior employees or managers for payment of extra insurance premiums. It is, 
however, not common to include these persons.  
 
 
35. Standing to claim under a D&O policy 
 
The insured person has the right to claim for performance under a policy in a 
case where the insurance contingency has occurred. If provided for in a specific 
provision in the conditions of the D&O insurance policy, according to art 6:253 
DCC and art 6:254 DCC, a third party can assert direct claims against the in-
surer.169 In general, no such provisions are made. 
An exception to this is a so-called direct action from third parties against 
the insurer. This is only possible in the case of damage due to injury or death: 
‘If, in case of an insurance against liability, the insurer has been informed pursu-
ant to Article 7:941 DCC of the materialisation of the risk, then the injured person 
may claim that, if an insurance benefit has to be paid by the insurer to the insured 
person, the amount of this benefit, which the insured person under the insurance 
agreement may claim from the insurer on the grounds of the death or injury of the 
injured person, is paid directly to him’ (art 7:954 DCC). 
 
 
35.1. Case Study (claims for performance by the company) 
 
As we understand it, there is a Side A cover under the D&O insurance policy. 
Usually, compensation under this insurance is payable to either the Directors, 
Supervisory Directors and/or de facto Directors themselves, or the Corpo-
ration itself (as policyholder). In this case, it is established that D is liable to-
wards C-Corporation. See the answer to question 35. D has the right to claim for 
performance under the insurance. If D goes into hiding or becomes bankrupt, 
this does not change the legal assessment. 
 
 
 _____ 
169 Asser/Wansink/Van Tiggele & Salomons 7-IX* 2012/389. 
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35.2. Case Study (claims for performance by third parties) 
 
P cannot assert his claim directly against the insurer under the policy. Claims 
can only be asserted directly against the insurer if the damage suffered is due to 
injury or death. This answer does not change in the event that P has no contrac-
tual relationship with C-Corporation or if D becomes bankrupt. 
 
 
36. Definition and occurrence of the insured event: D&O vs legal protection 
insurance 
 
D&O insurance is an insurance which covers personal liability of the insured 
persons for damage caused to third parties – including their respective Corpo-
rations – inflicted by an incident, provided that the claims made conditions un-
der the agreement are met.170 Such an incident is commonly described as: ‘an 
act or omission that results in liability’. Generally, D&O insurance is based 
on the claims made principle. This means that the claim has to be made within 
the duration of the insurance agreement. Depending on the conditions of the in-
surance policy, a claim can be made when it has been filed with the insurer or 
when it has been made against the insured person. A combination of those is 
also possible. Mostly, it is possible to buy additional insurance to extend the pe-
riod within which a claim that is made falls under the insurance agreement (uit-
loopregeling). 171 An insured event, as such, does not occur when the Corporation 
receives a claim letter from a shareholder of a third party. However, the policy-
holder (ie the Corporation) is obliged to notify the insurer of the claim as an 
event that could lead to liability and that could lead to payment of compensa-
tion by the insurer. If the policyholder does not notify the insurer within the no-
tification period stipulated in the policy, this – in general – leads to a breach of 
contract by the policyholder due to which the insurer is no longer obliged to pay 
compensation. Under certain insurance policies it is possible that coverage ex-
ists when the insurer has been notified of certain circumstances within the du-
ration of the insurance that may lead to a claim that will be made after the in-
surance has been expired.  
The core purpose of a D&O insurance policy is to provide financial protection 
for D&Os against the consequences of actual or alleged ‘wrongful acts’ when act-
ing in the scope of their duties. Intentional illegal acts, however, are typically not  _____ 
170 De Groot, Bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid (2011) 303 ff. 
171 M de Kort-de Wolde/P Potjewijd, Verzekering en vrijwaring, Ondernemingsrecht 2005/93, 
278–283. 
166 
167 
168 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in the Netherlands | 367 
 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
covered under D&O insurance policies. The D&O insurance policy will pay for de-
fence costs (in civil litigation) and financial losses when this will serve the pri-
mary objective of the insurance, which is the protection of assets of the D&O 
against the claim made in relation to acts as D&O.172 In addition, extensions to 
many D&O policies also cover costs for D&Os generated by administrative and 
criminal proceedings or in the course of investigations by regulators or criminal 
prosecutors. In other words: the D&O insurance policy has a wider scope than 
legal protection insurance. The latter only covers the costs for legal assistance. 
 
 
36.1. Case Study (costs of defending a director against a claim by the 
company) 
 
The answer to this question depends on the conditions of the D&O insurance 
policy. In general, the costs of the defence of D against claims asserted by  
C-Corporation (based on internal liability – art 2:9 DCC) are included in the cov-
erage provided by a D&O insurance policy. 
 
 
37. Scope of D&O coverage and the insurer’s obligations: D&O vs legal 
protection insurance 
 
In the Netherlands a Side A cover or Direct Coverage, covering the personal 
liability of Directors, Supervisory Directors and shadow/de facto Directors (as 
explained in relation to question 34) as individuals, is part of the remuneration 
of Directors and Officers of larger multinational (listed) Corporations, and –  
increasingly – also part of the remuneration of Directors and Supervisory Direc-
tors of SMEs. Also a Side B cover or Corporate Reimbursement, ie the reim-
bursement of the insured Corporation if it paid out the claim of a third party on 
behalf of its Director(s) and/or Supervisory Director(s), is common in the Neth-
erlands. Listed Corporations can also obtain a Side C cover of Securities Entity 
Coverage, ie a cover for claims against the Corporation itself for a wrongful act 
in connection with the trading of its securities. 
A D&O insurance policy provides financial protection for insured persons 
against the consequences of actual or alleged wrongful acts when acting within 
the scope of their duties. Its covers damages, judgments, settlements, costs 
of defence of legal actions, claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom, 
 _____ 
172 Hendrikse (fn 168) 325–336. 
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salvage costs, rehabilitation costs and other extra costs approved by the 
insurer. In addition, extensions to many D&O insurance policies also cover 
costs for insured persons generated by administrative and criminal proceedings 
or in the course of investigations by regulators or criminal prosecutors. Costs for 
legal defence, extra costs and salvage costs must be compensated in advance 
by the insurer if the costs are approved by him or incurred at his request. Re-
garding legal defence, insurers decide, after consultation with the insured per-
son and the Corporation, on (i) acknowledgement of the liability, (ii) the as-
sessment of the damages, (iii) the appointment of a lawyer and/or expert and 
the instructions given to them, and (iv) possible settlements. 
According to art 4:67 Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel 
toezicht) (‘FSA’), common legal protection insurers must ensure that the con-
tract for legal assistance cover stipulates expressly that the insured person is 
free to choose a lawyer or another expert competent by law if: 
– a lawyer or other expert competent by law is requested to defend, rep-
resent or promote the interests of the insured person in court or admin-
istrative proceedings; 
– a conflict of interest arises. 
In the Netherlands there is still an ongoing debate as to which extent com-
mon legal insurers must amend the conditions of their legal protection policy to 
act according to the free choice of lawyer principle.173 In practice D&O liability 
cases are handled by specialist lawyers. The insurer and the insured persons 
agree upon who is the legal representative. It is in the interest of both insurer 
and the insured person to appoint a highly qualified lawyer for these matters. 
Another issue is avoiding conflicts of interest between the insured persons 
themselves and/or the Corporation (Side A and Side B cover).  
 
 
37.1. Case Study (advance payments for legal defence) 
 
If the D&O insurance policy provides for a Side A (Direct Coverage) and Side B 
(Corporate Reimbursement), this constitutes an insured event under the 
D&O insurance policy. Only if D acted as a Director of C-Corporation must the 
insurer compensate (in advance) the costs for legal defence, extra costs and 
salvage costs if these costs are approved by the insurer or incurred at his re-
quest. We refer to the answer to case study 37.1.  _____ 
173 Not only due to art 4:67 FSA, but also to the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) 7.11.2013, C-442/12, Sneller v DAS Nederlandse Rechtsbijstand Verzeker-
ingsmaatschappij NV, ECLI:EU:C:2013:717. 
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37.2. Case Study (reimbursement and compensation for fines and 
imprisonment) 
 
D can probably not claim any payment under the D&O insurance policy for any 
of the offences mentioned in this case study. Fines and damage due to im-
prisonment are, in general, excluded from coverage. The degree of intention 
is, in general, irrelevant due to this exclusion. When the insurance involves a 
global coverage, punitive damages may be included under certain conditions.174 
Intentional acts will most likely be excluded. However, conditional intention – 
when the insured person has accepted the likely chance that the damage would 
occur – may fall within the scope of the insurance (see answer to question 39).175 
Costs of defence incurred in relation to the legal proceedings pertaining to the 
imprisonment may in principle be claimed by D.176 
 
 
37.3. Case Study (pure economic loss/mass claims) 
 
If the financial condition of the Corporation has been misrepresented in the an-
nual accounts or in the interim figures as published by the Corporation or in the 
annual report, then the Directors are jointly and severally liable towards 
third parties for the damage which they have suffered as a result thereof. A Di-
rector, who proves that such misrepresentation is not attributable to him, is not 
liable (arts 2:139/249 DCC).  
The investors can sue D, regardless of any negligence, for damages because 
when the annual accounts misrepresent the condition of the Corporation, 
Directors are liable towards third parties for losses suffered as a result thereof. D 
may, however, plead that the misrepresentation in the annual accounts is not 
attributable to him. It is not likely that D will succeed in this defence, because 
the financial affairs of the Corporation are the joint responsibility of the Direc-
tors.  
If there is fault on the part of the Director, a D&O insurance policy would 
(depending on the terms and conditions of the insurance agreement) be able to  _____ 
174 A Hendrikse/DAM van den Heuvel, Bescherming tegen bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid in 
tijden van crisis, Tijdschrift voor de Ondernemingsrechtpraktijk 2009/4, 127–131. 
175 WCT Weterings, Bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid, D&O verzekering en moreel risico: hante-
ren van eigen risico bij Side-A dekking is wenselijk, Ondernemingsrecht 2011/116, 571–580.  
176 MHC Sinninghe Damsté, Biedt de bestuurdersaansprakelijkheidsverzekering afdoende be-
scherming tegen civielrechtelijke, strafrechtelijke en bestuursrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid? De 
stand van zaken anno 2015, in: M Holtzer et al (eds), Geschriften vanwege de Vereniging Corpo-
rate Litigation 2014-2015, Serie vanwege het Van der Heijden Instituut deel 128 (2015) 171–191. 
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cover negligence, gross negligence and even conscious disregard of duties, but 
not bad faith with the actual intent to do harm. 
 
 
38. Duties of D&O policyholders and insurers’ right to participate in the 
claims handling process 
 
In general, but not limited to the following, the policyholder and the insured 
person have the following obligations: 
– the policyholder must pay the premiums; 
– the policyholder must give the insurer notification of any alleged or 
asserted claim as soon as reasonably practicable after it first becomes 
aware of such claim but no later than within a period set out in the con-
ditions of the D&O insurance policy; 
– the policyholder must provide the insurer with such further informa-
tion and documentation as it may reasonably require; 
– in the event of a claim, the insured party will at all times and at its own 
cost provide the insurer with all information, evidence, documenta-
tion, assistance and co-operation and will execute such documents, 
including signed statements and affidavits, which the insurer reasona-
bly requests; 
– the insured party will at all times and at its own costs use reasonable 
endeavours to do and concur in doing everything reasonably practica-
ble to avoid or diminish loss and to assist with the defence, inves-
tigation or settlement of any claim; 
– the insured party is obliged to contest and defend any claim made 
against him; 
– to inform the insurer about: (i) major changes in the activities of the 
enterprise of the Corporation (mergers, acquisitions, (new) subsidiaries 
and participations, expansion, reduction, strike(s)); (ii) amendments of 
the articles of association; (iii) change of control; (iv) upcoming liquid-
ity problems; and (v) the appointment of a receiver or trustee. 
In general, the insurer is entitled to associate and participate fully in the 
defence or settlement of any claim. Usually, the insurer reserves its rights un-
der the D&O insurance policy, including its right to agree or deny cover while it 
assesses a claim or participates in the defence of any claim. In general, the poli-
cyholder and the insured person(s) must not settle or offer to settle any claim, 
incur any costs of defence and/or other costs, charges, fees or expenses, or oth-
erwise assume any contractual obligation or admit any liability in respect of any 
claim without the insurer’s prior written consent, which shall not be unrea-
179 
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sonably delayed or withheld. For the appointment of a lawyer we refer to the 
answer to case study 37.1. 
In the event that the policyholder and/or the insured person do(es) not fulfil 
one of the obligations as described and the insurer is harmed in its interest due 
to this non-fulfilment, the insurer is no longer obliged to provide cover under 
the D&O insurance policy or to pay compensations. 
 
 
39. Typical exclusions from coverage in D&O policies 
 
Common exclusions in D&O general policy conditions are: (i) any deliberately 
fraudulent or deliberately dishonest act or omission; (ii) any wilful violation of 
law or wilful breach of duty imposed by any law; (iii) illegal remuneration or 
personal profit; (iv) property damage and bodily harm; (v) legal action already 
taken when the policy begins; (vi) claims made under a previous policy; and 
(vii) claims covered by other insurance. 
Furthermore, art 7:952 DCC stipulates that damage caused intentionally or 
due to recklessness will not be reimbursed by the insurer. Conditional intent 
and lower degrees of intent are, in general, still covered by the insurance.177 As 
art 7:952 DCC contains regulatory law, parties can agree to exclude other dam-
age from reimbursement, or include higher degrees of intent.178 However, the 
Dutch Supreme Court decided that the highest degree of intent (intention as 
purpose) cannot be insured, as it would breach art 3:40 DCC. Finally, 
arts 7:925 in conjunction with 7:928 DCC exclude circumstances already 
known to the insurer at the commencing date of the insurance. 
 
 
40. Claim for determining the insurance coverage 
 
Any complaints or disputes that arise between the insurer on the one hand and 
the policyholder and/or the insured person on the other shall in first instance be 
settled by ‘Kifid’179 or any other organization for the settlement of complaints. 
More commonly, disputes are settled by the court. The policyholder as well as 
the insured person may file a claim against the insurer. Some D&O insurers 
have general conditions that stipulate that the transfer or cession of the right to 
 _____ 
177 De Groot (fn 170) 3025 ff. 
178 Cieremans, GS Bijzondere overeenkomsten, art 952 Boek 7 BW, aant 7. 
179 An independent institution that mediates between consumers and banks, insurers and 
other financial services; <www.kifid.nl>. 
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claim is not possible or is invalid. Although it is possible to stipulate that on be-
half of the insured person the Corporation can claim under the D&O insurance 
policy, it is not likely that such a provision will be agreed upon due to possible 
conflicts of interest that could occur under Side A and Side B cover. 
 
 
41. Differences between the legal position of the board or director 
 
41.1. Case Study (comparison of D&O insurance vs exclusion of liability) 
 
Side A coverage under a D&O insurance policy as described in situation (a) is 
valid and protects D as Director of C-Corporation for claims if his liability is es-
tablished.  
An exclusion of liability as described under situation (b) is invalid as 
art 2:9 DCC is considered imperative law. Any provision in agreements or resolu-
tion of appointment that excludes liability on the basis of art 2:9 DCC is void due 
to violation of law (art 3:40 DCC).180 We refer to the answer to case studies 17, 18, 
18.1, 22 and 22.1. D is therefore not protected from claims of C-Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 _____ 
180 Eg Court of Amsterdam 30 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:6932. 
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